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Much of the extensive empirical literature on insurance markets has focused on whether adverse selection
can be detected. Once detected, however, there has been little attempt to quantify its importance. We
start by showing theoretically that the efficiency cost of adverse selection cannot be inferred from
reduced form evidence of how "adversely selected" an insurance market appears to be. Instead, an
explicit model of insurance contract choice is required. We develop and estimate such a model in the
context of the U.K. annuity market. The model allows for private information about risk type (mortality)
as well as heterogeneity in preferences over different contract options. We focus on the choice of length
of guarantee among individuals who are required to buy annuities. The results suggest that asymmetric
information along the guarantee margin reduces welfare relative to a first-best, symmetric information
benchmark by about £127 million per year, or about 2 percent of annual premiums. We also find that
government mandates, the canonical solution to adverse selection problems, do not necessarily improve
on the asymmetric information equilibrium. Depending on the contract mandated, mandates could
reduce welfare by as much as £107 million annually, or increase it by as much as £127 million. Since
determining which mandates would be welfare improving is empirically difficult, our findings suggest






















Ever since the seminal works of Akerlof (1970) and Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), a rich theoret-
ical literature has emphasized the negative welfare consequences of adverse selection in insurance
markets and the potential for welfare-improving government intervention. More recently, a grow-
ing empirical literature has developed ways to detect whether asymmetric information exists in
particular insurance markets (Chiappori and Salanie, 2000; Finkelstein and McGarry, 2006). Once
adverse selection is detected, however, there has been no attempt to estimate the magnitude of its
e¢ ciency costs, or to compare welfare in the asymmetric information equilibrium to what would
be achieved by potential government interventions. Motivated by this, the paper develops an em-
pirical approach that can quantify the e¢ ciency cost of asymmetric information and the welfare
consequences of government intervention in an insurance market. We apply our approach to a
particular market in which adverse selection has been detected, the market for annuities in the
United Kingdom.
We begin by establishing a general ￿impossibility￿result that is not speci￿c to our application.
We show that even when asymmetric information is known to exist, the reduced form equilibrium
relationship between insurance coverage and risk occurrence does not permit inference about the
magnitude of the e¢ ciency cost of this asymmetric information. Relatedly, the reduced form is
not su¢ cient to determine whether mandatory social insurance could improve welfare, or what
type of mandate would do so. Such inferences require knowledge of the risk type and preferences
of individuals receiving di⁄erent insurance allocations in the private market equilibrium. These
results motivate the more structural approach that we take in the rest of the paper.
Our approach uses insurance company data on individual insurance choices and ex-post risk
experience, and it relies on the ability to recover the joint distribution of (unobserved) risk type
and preferences of consumers. This joint distribution allows us to compute welfare at the observed
allocation, as well as to compute allocations and welfare for counterfactual scenarios. We compare
welfare under the observed asymmetric information allocation to what would be achieved under the
￿rst-best, symmetric information benchmark; this comparison provides our measure of the welfare
cost of asymmetric information. We also compare equilibrium welfare to what would be obtained
under mandatory social insurance programs; this comparison sheds light on the potential for welfare
improving government intervention.
Mandatory social insurance is the canonical solution to the problem of adverse selection in
insurance markets (e.g., Akerlof, 1970). Yet, as emphasized by Feldstein (2005) among others,
mandates are not necessarily welfare improving when individuals di⁄er in their preferences. When
individuals di⁄er in both their preferences and their (privately known) risk types, mandates may
involve a trade-o⁄ between the allocative ine¢ ciency produced by adverse selection and the alloca-
tive ine¢ ciency produced by the elimination of self-selection. Whether and which mandates can
increase welfare thus becomes an empirical question.
We apply our approach to the semi-compulsory market for annuities in the United Kingdom.
Individuals who have accumulated savings in tax-preferred retirement saving accounts (the equiva-
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balances at retirement. These annuity contracts provide a life-contingent stream of payments. As a
result of these requirements, there is a sizable volume in the market. In 1998, new funds annuitized
in this market totalled $6 billion (Association of British Insurers, 1999).
Although they are required to annuitize their balances, individuals are allowed choice in their
annuity contract. In particular, they can choose from among guarantee periods of 0, 5, or 10
years. During a guarantee period, annuity payments are made (to the annuitant or to his estate)
regardless of the annuitant￿ s survival. All else equal, a guarantee period reduces the amount of
mortality-contingent payments in the annuity and, as a result, the e⁄ective amount of insurance.
In the extreme, a 65 year old who purchases a 50 year guaranteed annuity has in essence purchased
a bond with deterministic payments. Presumably for this reason, individuals in this market are
restricted from purchasing a guarantee of more than 10 years.
The pension annuity market provides a particularly interesting setting in which to explore
the welfare costs of asymmetric information and of potential government intervention. Annuity
markets have attracted increasing attention and interest as Social Security reform proposals have
been advanced in various countries. Some proposals call for partly or fully replacing government-
provided de￿ned bene￿t, pay-as-you-go retirement systems with de￿ned contribution systems in
which individuals would accumulate assets in individual accounts. In such systems, an important
question concerns whether the government would require individuals to annuitize some or all of
their balance, and whether it would allow choice over the type of annuity product purchased.
The relative attractiveness of these various options depends critically on consumer welfare in each
alternative equilibrium.
In addition to their substantive interest, several features of annuities make them a particularly
attractive setting in which to operationalize our framework. First, adverse selection has already
been detected and documented in this market along the choice of guarantee period, with pri-
vate information about longevity a⁄ecting both the choice of contract and its price in equilibrium
(Finkelstein and Poterba, 2004 and 2006). Second, annuities are relatively simple and clearly de-
￿ned contracts, so modeling the contract choice requires less abstraction than in other insurance
settings. Third, the case for moral hazard in annuities is arguably substantially less compelling
than for other forms of insurance; our ability to assume away moral hazard substantially simpli￿es
the empirical analysis.
Our empirical object of interest is the joint distribution of risk and preferences. To estimate
it, we rely on two key modeling assumptions. First, to recover risk types (which in the context
of annuities means mortality types), we make a distributional assumption that mortality follows a
Gompertz distribution at the individual level. Individuals￿mortality tracks their own individual-
speci￿c mortality rates, allowing us to recover the extent of heterogeneity in (ex-ante) mortality
rates from (ex-post) information about mortality realization. Second, to recover preferences, we
use a standard dynamic model of consumption by retirees. We assume that retirees know their
(ex-ante) mortality type, which governs their stochastic time of death. This model allows us to
evaluate the (ex-ante) value-maximizing choice of a guarantee period. A longer guarantee period,
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to die sooner. This is the source of adverse selection. Preferences also in￿ uence guarantee choices:
a longer guarantee is more attractive to individuals who care more about their wealth when they
die.
Given the above assumptions, the parameters of the model are identi￿ed from the variation in
mortality and guarantee choices in the data, and in particular from the correlation between them.
However, no modeling assumptions are needed to establish the existence of private information
about the individual￿ s mortality rate. This is apparent from the existence of (conditional) correla-
tion between guarantee choices and ex post mortality in the data. Given the annuity choice model,
rationalizing the observed choices with only variation in mortality risk is hard. Indeed, our ￿ndings
suggest that both private information about risk type and preferences are important determinants
of the equilibrium insurance allocations.
We measure welfare in a given annuity allocation as the average amount of money an individual
would need, to make him as well o⁄ without the annuity as with his annuity allocation and his
pre-existing wealth. Relative to a symmetric information, ￿rst-best benchmark, we ￿nd that the
welfare cost of asymmetric information within the annuity market along the guarantee margin is
about $127 million per year, or about two percent of the annual premiums in this market. To
put these welfare estimates in context given the margin of choice, we benchmark them against the
maximum money at stake in the choice of guarantee. This benchmark is de￿ned as the additional
(ex-ante) amount of wealth required to ensure that if individuals were forced to buy the policy with
the least amount of insurance, they would be at least as well o⁄ as they had been. Our estimates
imply that the costs of asymmetric information are about 25 percent of this maximum money at
stake.
We also ￿nd that government mandates do not necessarily improve on the asymmetric informa-
tion equilibrium. We estimate that a mandatory social insurance program that eliminated choice
over guarantee could reduce welfare by as much as $107 million per year, or increase welfare by as
much as $127 million per year, depending on what guarantee contract the public policy mandates.
The welfare-maximizing contract would not be apparent to the government without knowledge of
the distribution of risk types and preferences. For example, although a 5 year guarantee period is
by far the most common choice in the asymmetric information equilibrium, we estimate that the
welfare-maximizing mandate is a 10 year guarantee. Since determining which mandates would be
welfare improving is empirically di¢ cult, our results suggest that achieving welfare gains through
mandatory social insurance may be harder in practice than simple theory would suggest.
As we demonstrate in our initial theoretical analysis, estimation of the welfare consequences
of asymmetric information or of government intervention requires that we specify and estimate a
structural model of annuity demand. This involves assumptions about the nature of the utility
model that governs annuity choice, as well as several other parametric assumptions, which are
required for operational and computational reasons. A critical question is how important these
particular assumptions are for our central welfare estimates. We therefore explore a range of possible
alternatives, both for the appropriate utility model and for our various parametric assumptions.
3We are reassured that our central estimates are quite stable and do not change much under most
of the speci￿cations we estimate. The ￿nding that a 10 year guarantee is the optimal mandate is
also robust across these alternative speci￿cations.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops a simple model that produces
the ￿impossibility result￿which motivates the subsequent empirical work. Section 3 describes the
model of annuity demand and discusses our estimation approach, and Section 4 describes the data.
Section 5 presents our parameter estimates and discusses their in-sample and out-of-sample ￿t.
Section 6 presents the implications of our estimates for the welfare costs of asymmetric information
in this market, as well as the welfare consequences of potential government policies. The robustness
of the results is explored in Section 7. Section 8 concludes by brie￿ y summarizing our ￿ndings and
discussing how the approach we develop can be applied in other insurance markets, including those
where moral hazard is likely to be important.
2 Motivating theory
The seminal theoretical work on asymmetric information emphasized that asymmetric information
distorts the market equilibrium away from the ￿rst best (Akerlof, 1970; Rothschild and Stiglitz
1976). Intuitively, if individuals who appear observationally identical to the insurance company
di⁄er in their expected insurance claims, a common insurance price is likely to distort optimal
insurance coverage for at least some of these individuals. The sign and magnitude of this distortion
varies with the individual￿ s risk type and with his elasticity of demand for insurance, i.e. indi-
vidual preferences. Estimation of the e¢ ciency cost of asymmetric information therefore requires
estimation of individuals￿preferences and their risk types.
Structural estimation of the joint distribution of risk type and preferences will require addi-
tional assumptions. We therefore begin by asking whether we can make any inferences about the
e¢ ciency costs of asymmetric information from reduced form evidence about the risk experience
of individuals with di⁄erent insurance contracts. For example, suppose we observe two di⁄erent
insurance markets with asymmetric information, one of which appears extremely adversely selected
(i.e. the insured have a much higher risk occurrence than the uninsured) while in the other the risk
experience of the insured individuals is indistinguishable from that of the uninsured. Can we at
least make comparative statements about which market is likely to have a greater e¢ ciency cost of
asymmetric information? Unfortunately, we conclude that, without strong additional assumptions,
the reduced form relationship between insurance coverage and risk occurrence is not informative
for even qualitative statements about the e¢ ciency costs of asymmetric information. Relatedly,
we show that the reduced form is not su¢ cient to determine whether or what mandatory social
insurance program could improve welfare relative to the asymmetric information equilibrium. This
motivates our subsequent development and estimation of a structural model of preferences and risk
type.
Compared to the canonical framework of insurance markets used by Rothschild and Stiglitz
(1976) and many others, we obtain our ￿impossibility results￿by incorporating two additional fea-
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types but also in their preferences. Several recent empirical papers have found evidence of sub-
stantial unobserved preference heterogeneity in di⁄erent insurance markets, including automobile
insurance (Cohen and Einav, 2007), reverse mortgages (Davido⁄ and Welke, 2005), health insur-
ance (Fang, Keane, and Silverman, 2006), and long-term care insurance (Finkelstein and McGarry,
2006). Second, we allow for a loading factor on insurance. There is evidence of non-trivial loading
factors in many insurance markets, including long-term care insurance (Brown and Finkelstein,
2004), annuity markets (Friedman and Warshawsky, 1990; Mitchell et al., 1999; and Finkelstein
and Poterba, 2002), life insurance (Cutler and Zeckhauser, 2000), and automobile insurance (Chi-
appori et al., 2006). The loading factor implies that the ￿rst best may require di⁄erent insurance
allocations to di⁄erent individuals. Without a loading factor, the ￿rst best can always be achieved
by mandating full coverage (unless risk loving is a possibility). This is a special feature of the
canonical insurance context. In the context of annuities, which is the focus of the rest of the paper,
the results will hold even without a loading factor; as we discuss later in more detail, heterogeneous
preferences for annuities are su¢ cient to produce heterogeneous insurance allocations in the ￿rst
best.
Our analysis is in the spirit of Chiappori et al. (2006), who demonstrate that in the presence
of load factors and unobserved preference heterogeneity, the reduced form correlation between
insurance coverage and risk occurrence cannot be used to test for asymmetric information about
risk type. In contrast to this analysis, we assume the existence of asymmetric information and ask
whether the reduced form correlation is then informative about the extent of the e¢ ciency costs of
this asymmetric information.
As our results are negative, we adopt the simplest framework possible in which they obtain.
We assume that individuals face an (exogenously given) binary decision of whether or not to buy
insurance that covers the entire loss in the event of accident. Endogenizing the equilibrium contract
set is di¢ cult when unobserved heterogeneity in risk preferences and risk types is allowed, as the
single crossing property no longer holds. Various recent papers have made progress on this front
(Smart, 2000; Wambach, 2000; de Meza and Webb, 2001; and Jullien, Salanie, and Salanie, 2007).
Our basic result is likely to hold in this more complex environment, but the analysis and intuition
would be substantially less clear than in our simple setting in which we exogenously restrict the
contract space but determine the equilibrium price endogenously.
Setup and notation Individual i with a von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) utility function ui
and income yi faces the risk of ￿nancial loss mi < yi with probability pi. We abstract from moral
hazard, so pi is invariant to the coverage decision. The full insurance policy that the individual
may purchase reimburses mi in the event of an accident. We denote the price of this insurance by
￿i.
In making the coverage choice, individual i compares the utility he obtains from buying insurance
VI;i ￿ ui(yi ￿ ￿i) (1)
5with the expected utility he obtains without insurance
VN;i ￿ (1 ￿ pi)ui(yi) + piui(yi ￿ mi) (2)
The individual will buy insurance if and only if VI;i ￿ VN;i. Since VI;i is decreasing in the price
of insurance ￿i, and VN;i is independent of this price, the individual￿ s demand for insurance can
be characterized by a reservation price ￿i. The individual prefers to buy insurance if and only if
￿i ￿ ￿i.
To analyze this choice, we further restrict attention to the case of constant absolute risk aversion
(CARA), so that ui(x) = ￿e￿rix. A similar analysis can be performed more generally. Our choice
of CARA simpli￿es the exposition as the risk premium and welfare are invariant to income, so we
do not need to make any assumptions about the relationship between income and risk. Using a
CARA utility function, we can use the equation VI;i(￿i) = VN;i to solve for ￿i, which is given by
￿i = ￿(pi;mi;ri) =
1
ri
ln(1 ￿ pi + pierimi) (3)
Due to the CARA property, the willingness to pay for insurance is independent of income yi. The
certainty equivalent of individual i is given by yi ￿ ￿i. Naturally, as the coe¢ cient of absolute risk
aversion ri goes to zero, ￿(pi;mi;ri) goes to the expected loss pimi. The following propositions
show other intuitive properties of ￿(pi;mi;ri).
Proposition 1 ￿(pi;mi;ri) is increasing in pi, mi, and in ri.
Proposition 2 ￿(pi;mi;ri) ￿ pimi is positive, is increasing in mi and in ri, and is initially in-
creasing and then decreasing in pi.
Both proofs are in the appendix. Note that ￿(pi;mi;ri)￿pimi is the individual￿ s ￿risk premium.￿
It denotes the individual￿ s willingness to pay for insurance above and beyond the expected payments
from the insurance.
First best Providing insurance may be costly, and we consider a ￿xed load per insurance contract
F ￿ 0. This can be thought of as the administrative processing costs associated with selling
insurance. Total surplus in the market is the sum of certainty equivalents for consumers and pro￿ts
of ￿rms; we will restrict our attention to zero-pro￿t equilibria in all cases we consider below. Since
the premium paid for insurance is just a transfer between individuals and ￿rms, we obtain the
following de￿nition:
Remark 3 It is socially e¢ cient for individual i to purchase insurance if and only if
￿i ￿ pimi > F (4)
In other words, it is socially e¢ cient for individual i (de￿ned by his risk type pi and risk aversion
ri) to purchase insurance only if his reservation price, ￿i, is at least as great as the expected social
6cost of providing the insurance, pimi+F. That is, if the risk premium, ￿i￿pimi, which is the social
value, exceeds the ￿xed load, which is the social cost. Since ￿i > pimi when ri > 0 then, trivially,
when F = 0 providing insurance to everyone would be the ￿rst best. When F > 0, however, it
may no longer be e¢ cient for all individuals to buy insurance. Moreover, Proposition (2) indicates
that the socially e¢ cient purchase decision will vary with individual￿ s private information about
risk type and risk preferences.
Market equilibrium with private information about risk type We now introduce private
information about risk type. Speci￿cally, individuals know their own pi but the insurance companies
know only that it is drawn from the distribution f(p). To simplify further, we will assume that
mi = m for all individuals and that pi can take only one of two values, pH and pL with pH > pL.
Assume that the fraction of type H (L) is ￿H (￿L) and the risk aversion parameter of risk type
H (L) is rH (rL). Note that rH could, in principle, be higher, lower, or the same as rL. To
illustrate our result that positive correlation between risk occurrence and insurance coverage is
neither necessary nor su¢ cient in establishing the extent of ine¢ ciency, we will show, by examples,
that all four cases could in principle exist: positive correlation with and without ine¢ ciency, and no
positive correlation with and without ine¢ ciency. Of course, the possibility of a ￿rst best outcome
(i.e. no ine¢ ciency) with asymmetric information about risk type is an artifact of our simplifying
assumptions that there are a discrete number of types and contracts; with a continuum of types, a
￿rst best outcome would not generally be obtainable. The basic insight, however, that the extent of
ine¢ ciency cannot be inferred from the reduced form correlation would carry over to more general
settings.
In all cases below, we assume n ￿ 2 ￿rms that compete in prices and we solve for the Nash
Equilibrium. As in a simple homogeneous product Bertrand competition, consumers choose the
lowest price. If both ￿rms o⁄er the same price, consumers are allocated randomly to each ￿rm.
Pro￿ts per consumer are given by
R(￿) =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
0 if ￿ > max(￿L;￿H)
￿H (￿ ￿ mpH ￿ F) if ￿L < ￿ ￿ ￿H
￿L (￿ ￿ mpL ￿ F) if ￿H < ￿ ￿ ￿L
￿ ￿ mp￿ ￿ F if ￿ ￿ min(￿L;￿H)
(5)
where p￿ ￿ ￿HpH +￿LpL is the average risk probability. We restrict attention to equilibria in pure
strategies, and derive below several simple results. All proofs are in the appendix.
Proposition 4 In any pure strategy Nash equilibrium, pro￿ts are zero.
Proposition 5 If mp￿+F < min(￿L;￿H) the unique equilibrium is the pooling equilibrium, ￿Pool =
mp￿ + F.
Proposition 6 If mp￿+F > min(￿L;￿H) the unique equilibrium with positive demand, if it exists,
is to set ￿ = mp￿ + F and serve only type ￿; where ￿ = H (L) if ￿L < ￿H (￿H < ￿L).
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indicate our main result: if we allow for the possibility of loads (F > 0) and preference hetero-
geneity (in particular, rL > rH) the reduced form relationship between insurance coverage and risk
occurrence is neither necessary nor su¢ cient for any conclusion regarding e¢ ciency. It is important
to note that throughout the discussion of the four cases, we do not claim that the assumptions in
the ￿rst column are either necessary or su¢ cient to produce the e¢ cient and equilibrium allocations
shown; we only claim that these allocations are possible equilibria given the assumptions. Appen-
dix A provides the necessary parameter conditions that give rise to the e¢ cient and equilibrium
allocations shown in Table 1, and proves that the set of parameters that satisfy each parameter
restriction is non-empty.
Case 1 corresponds to the result found in the canonical asymmetric information models, such
as Akerlof (1970) or Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). The equilibrium is ine¢ cient relative to the
￿rst best (displaying under-insurance), and there is a positive correlation between risk type and
insurance coverage as only the high risk buy. This case can arise under the standard assumptions
that there is no load (F = 0) and no preference heterogeneity (rL = rH). Because there is no load,
we know from the de￿nition of social e¢ ciency above that the e¢ cient allocation is for both risk
types to buy insurance. However, the equilibrium allocation will be that only the high risk types
buy insurance if the low risk individuals￿reservation price is below the equilibrium pooling price.
In case 2 we consider an equilibrium that displays the positive correlation but is also e¢ cient. To
do so, we assume a positive load (F > 0) but maintain the assumption of homogeneous preferences
(rL = rH). Due to the presence of a load, it may no longer be socially e¢ cient for all individuals
to purchase insurance. In particular, we assume that it is socially e¢ cient only for the high risk
types to purchase insurance; with homogeneous preferences, this may be true if both pL and pH
are su¢ ciently low (see Proposition 2). The equilibrium allocation will involve only high risk types
purchasing in equilibrium if the reservation price for low risk types is below the equilibrium pooling
price, thereby obtaining the socially e¢ cient outcome as well as the positive correlation property.
In the last two cases, we continue to assume a positive load, but relax the assumption of
homogeneous preferences. In particular, we assume that the low risk individuals are more risk
averse (rL > rH). We also assume that it is socially e¢ cient for the low risk, but not for the high
risk, to be insured. This could follow simply from the higher risk aversion of the low risk types;
even if risk aversion were the same, it could be socially e¢ cient for the low risk but not the high
risk to be insured if pL and pH are su¢ ciently high (see Proposition 2). In case 3, we assume that
both types buy insurance. In other words, for both types the reservation price exceeds the pooling
price. Thus the equilibrium does not display a positive correlation between risk type and insurance
coverage (both types buy), but it is socially ine¢ cient; it exhibits over-insurance relative to the ￿rst
best since it is not e¢ cient for the high risk types to buy but they decide to do so at the (subsidized,
from their perspective) population average pooling price. Case 4 maintains the assumption that it
is socially e¢ cient for the low risk but not for the high risk to be insured. In other words, the low
risk type￿ s reservation price exceeds the social cost of providing low risk types with insurance, but
the high risk type￿ s reservation price does not exceed the social cost of providing the high risk type
8with insurance. However, in contrast to case 3, we now assume that the high risk type is not willing
to buy insurance at the low risk price, so that only low risk types are insured in equilibrium.1 Once
again, there is no positive correlation between risk type and insurance coverage (indeed, now there
is a negative correlation since only low risk types buy), but the equilibrium is socially e¢ cient.
Welfare consequences of mandates Given the simpli￿ed framework, there are only two po-
tential mandates to consider, full insurance mandate or no insurance mandate. While the latter
may seem unrealistic, it is analogous to a richer, more realistic setting in which mandates provide
less than full insurance coverage. Examples might include a mandate with a high deductible in a
general insurance context, or mandating a long guarantee period in the annuity context.
The ￿rst (trivial) observation is that a mandate may either improve or reduce welfare. To see
this, consider case 1 above, in which a full insurance mandate would be socially optimal, while a
no insurance mandate would be worse than the equilibrium allocation. The second observation,
which is closely related to the earlier results, is that the reduced-form correlation is not su¢ cient
to guide an optimal choice of a mandate. To see this, consider cases 1 and 2. In both cases, the
reduced form equilibrium is that only the high risk individuals (H) buy insurance. Yet, the optimal
mandate may vary. In case 1, mandating full insurance is optimal and achieves the ￿rst best. By
contrast, in case 2, the optimal (second best) mandate may be to mandate no insurance coverage.
This would happen if pH is su¢ ciently high, but the fraction of high risk types is low. In such a
case, requiring all low risk types to purchase insurance could be costly.2
3 Model and estimation
3.1 From insurance to annuity guarantee choice
While the rest of the paper analyzes annuity guarantee choices, the preceding section used a stan-
dard insurance framework to illustrate our theoretical point. We did this for three reasons. First,
the insurance framework is so widely used, that, we hope, the intuition will be more familiar.
Second, the point is quite general, and is not speci￿c to the particular application of this paper.
Finally, as will be clear soon, the insurance framework is slightly simpler. We start this section by
showing how a simple model of guarantee choice directly maps into this framework. We will also
use this simple model to introduce certain modeling assumptions that we use later for the baseline
model that we take to the data.
Annuities provide a survival-contingent stream of payments, except during the guarantee period
1Note that case 4 requires preference heterogeneity in order for the reservation price of high risk types to be below
that of low risk types (see Proposition 1).
2This last observation is somewhat special, as it deals with a case in which the equilibrium allocation achieves the
￿rst best. However, it is easy to construct examples in the same spirit, to produce cases in which both the competitive
outcome and either mandate fall short of the ￿rst best, and, depending on the parameters, the optimal mandate or
the equilibrium outcome is more e¢ cient. One way to construct such an example would be to introduce a third type
of consumers.
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ex-ante mortality rate therefore represents his risk type. Consider a two period model, and an
individual who dies with certainty by the beginning of period 2. The individual may die earlier,
in the beginning of period 1, with probability q. Before period 1 begins, the individual has to
annuitize all his assets, and can choose between two annuity contracts. The ￿rst contract, that
does not provide a guarantee, pays the individual an amount z in period 1, only if the individual
does not die. The second contract provides a guarantee, and pays the individual (or his estate) an
amount z ￿ ￿ in period 1 (￿ > 0), whether or not he is alive. The value of ￿ can be viewed as
the price of the guarantee. The individual obtains ￿ ow utility u(￿) from consumption while alive,
and a one-time utility b(￿) from wealth after death. For simplicity, we assume also that there is no
discounting and that there is no saving technology. We will relax both assumptions in the model
we estimate. Thus, if the individual chooses a contract with no guarantee, his utility is given by
VNG = (1 ￿ q)(u(z) + b(0)) + qb(0) (6)
and if he chooses a contract with guarantee, his utility is
VG = (1 ￿ q)(u(z ￿ ￿) + b(0)) + qb(z ￿ ￿): (7)
Renormalizing both utilities, the guarantee choice is reduced to a comparison between (1￿q)u(z)+
qb(0) and (1 ￿ q)u(z ￿ ￿) + qb(z ￿ ￿). This trade-o⁄ is very similar to the insurance choice in the
preceding section, which compares (1 ￿ p)u(y) + pu(y ￿ m) to (1 ￿ p)u(y ￿ ￿) + pu(y ￿ ￿).
As mentioned earlier, there is an important distinction between the two contexts. While in
the insurance context it is generally assumed that it is the same utility function u(￿) that applies
in both states of the world, in the annuity context there are two distinct functions, u(￿) and
b(￿). Thus, while full coverage is the ￿rst best in an insurance context without load, even with
preference heterogeneity in, say, risk aversion (and as long as individuals are never risk loving),
in the annuity context the ￿rst best can vary with preferences, even in the absence of loads.
For example, individuals who put no weight on wealth after death will always prefer to not buy
a guarantee, while individuals who put little weight on consumption utility will always prefer a
guarantee. This means that, when applied to an annuity context, the ￿impossibility results￿in the
preceding section do not rely on the existence of loading factors. Loading factors were introduced
there only as a way to introduce a possible wedge between full coverage and social e¢ ciency.
Preference heterogeneity is su¢ cient to introduce this wedge in an annuity context.
3.2 A model of guarantee choice
We now introduce the more complete model of guarantee choice that we estimate. We consider
the utility maximizing guarantee choice of a fully rational, forward looking, risk averse, retired
individual, with an accumulated stock of wealth, stochastic mortality, and time separable utility.
This framework has been widely used to model annuity choices (see, e.g., Kotliko⁄and Spivak,1981;
Mitchell et al., 1999; and Davido⁄ et al., 2005).
10At the time of the decision, the age of the individual is t0, which we normalize to zero (in our
application it will be either 60 or 65). The individual faces a random length of life3 characterized
by an annual mortality hazard qt during year t ￿ t0.4 Since the guarantee choice will be evaluated
numerically, we will also make the assumption that there exists time T by which the individual dies
with probability one. We assume that the individual has full (potentially private) information about
this random mortality process. As in the preceding section, the individual obtains utility from two
sources. When alive, he obtains ￿ ow utility from consumption. When dead, the individual obtains
a one-time utility that is a function of the value of his assets at the time of death. In particular, as of













is his probability of dying during year t, ￿ is his (annual) discount factor, u(￿) is his utility from
consumption, and b(￿) is the utility of wealth remaining after death wt.
A positive valuation for wealth at death may stem from a number of possible underlying struc-
tural preferences. Possible interpretations of a value for wealth after death include a bequest motive
(Sheshinski, 2006) and a ￿regret￿motive (Braun and Muermann, 2004). Since the exact structural
interpretation is not essential for our goal, we remain agnostic about it throughout the paper.
In the absence of an annuity, the optimal consumption plan can be computed numerically by
solving the following program
V NA
t (wt) = max
ct￿0
[(1 ￿ qt)(u(ct) + ￿Vt+1(wt+1)) + qtb(wt)] (9)
s:t: wt+1 = (1 + r)(wt ￿ ct) ￿ 0
That is, we make the standard assumption that, due to mortality risk, the individual cannot borrow
against the future, and that he accumulates the per-period interest rate r on his saving. Since death
is guaranteed by period T, the terminal condition for the program is given by
V NA
T+1(wT+1) = b(wT+1): (10)
Suppose now that the individual annuitizes a ￿xed fraction ￿ of his initial wealth, w0. Broadly
following the institutional framework, we take the (mandatory) fraction of annuitized wealth as
given. In exchange for paying ￿w0 to the annuity company at t = t0, the individual receives an
3Not surprisingly, we can rule out a model with deterministic length of life and perfect foresight. Most individuals
in the data choose a positive guarantee length and are alive at the end of it, thus violating such a model.
4In fact, we later estimate mortality risk at the daily level, and most annuity contracts are paying on a monthly
basis. However, since the model is solved numerically, we restrict the model to a coarser, annual frequency, reducing
the computational burden.
11annual payout of zt in real terms, when alive. Thus, the individual solves the same problem as
above, with two small modi￿cations. First, initial wealth is given by (1￿￿)w0. Second, the budget
constraint is modi￿ed to re￿ ect the additional annuity payments zt received every period.
For a given annuitized amount ￿w0, consider the three possible guarantee choices available in
the data, 0, 5, and 10 years. Each guarantee period g corresponds to an annual payout stream of
z
g
t , satisfying z0
t > z5
t > z10
t for any t. For each guarantee length g, the optimal consumption plan
can be computed numerically by solving
V
A(g)
t (wt) = max
ct￿0
h
(1 ￿ qt)(u(ct) + ￿V
A(g)





s:t: wt+1 = (1 + r)(wt + z
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t0 is the present value of the remaining guaranteed payments. This
mimics the typical practice: when an individual dies within the guarantee period, the insurance
company pays the present value of the remaining payments and closes the account. As before,
since death is guaranteed by period T, which is greater than the maximal length of guarantee, the
terminal condition for the program is given by
V
A(g)
T+1 (wT+1) = b(wT+1) (13)
The optimal guarantee choice is then given by





t0 ((1 ￿ ￿)w0)
o
(14)
Information about the annuitant￿ s guarantee choice combined with the assumption that this choice
was made optimally thus provides information about the annuitant￿ s underlying preference and
mortality parameters. A higher level of guarantee will be more attractive for individuals with
higher mortality rate and for individuals who get greater utility b(￿) from wealth after death.
3.3 Econometric speci￿cation and estimation
Before we can take the model to data, additional parametric assumptions are needed. In the
robustness section we revisit many of these assumptions, and assess how sensitive the results are
to them.
First, we model the mortality process. Mortality determines risk in the annuity context, and
therefore a⁄ects choices and pricing. We assume that the mortality outcome is a realization of an
individual-speci￿c Gompertz distribution. We choose the Gompertz functional form for the baseline
hazard, as this functional form is widely-used in the actuarial literature to model mortality (e.g.,
Horiuchi and Coale, 1982). Speci￿cally, the mortality risk of individual i in our data is described
by a Gompertz mortality rate ￿i. Therefore, conditional on living at t0, individual i￿ s probability




(1 ￿ exp(￿(t ￿ t0)))
￿
(15)
12where ￿ is the shape parameter of the Gompertz distribution, which is assumed common across
individuals, t is the individual￿ s age (in days), and t0 is some base age (which will be 60 in our
application). The corresponding hazard rate is ￿i exp(￿(t ￿ t0)). Lower values of ￿i correspond to
lower mortality hazards and higher survival rates. Everything else equal, individuals with higher
￿i are likely to die sooner, and therefore are more likely to bene￿t from and to purchase a (longer)
guarantee.
The second key object we specify is preference heterogeneity. As already mentioned, we remain
agnostic regarding the structural interpretation of utility that lead individuals to purchase guar-
antees. Therefore, we choose to model heterogeneity in this utility in a way that would be most
attractive, for intuition and for computation. We restrict consumption utility u(￿) to be the same
across individuals, and we model utility from wealth after death to be the same up to a proportional
shift. That is, we assume that bi(￿) = ￿ib(￿) where b(￿) is common to all individuals. ￿i can be
interpreted as the weight that individual i puts on wealth when dead relative to consumption while
alive. Individuals with higher ￿i are therefore more likely to purchase a (longer) guarantee. Note,
however, that since u(￿) is de￿ned over a ￿ ow of consumption while b(￿) is de￿ned over a stock of
wealth, it is hard to interpret the magnitude of ￿ directly.
To summarize our speci￿cation of heterogeneity, an individual in our data can be described by
two unobserved parameters (￿i;￿i). We assume that both are perfectly known to the individual
at the time of guarantee choice. While this perfect information assumption is strong, it is, in our
view, the most natural benchmark. Higher values of either ￿i or ￿i are associated with a higher
propensity to choose a (longer) guarantee period. However, only ￿i a⁄ects mortality, while ￿i does
not. Since we observe both guarantee choices and mortality, this is the main distinction between the
two parameters, which is key to the identi￿cation of the model, described below. In our benchmark


















which allows for correlation between preferences and mortality rates. In the robustness section we
explore other distributional assumptions.
To complete the econometric speci￿cation of the model, we follow the literature and assume a
standard CRRA utility function with parameter ￿, i.e. u(c) = c1￿￿
1￿￿ . We also assume that the utility
from wealth at death follows the same CRRA form with the same parameter ￿, i.e. b(w) = w1￿￿
1￿￿ .
This assumption, together with the fact (discussed below) that guarantee payments are proportional
to the annuitized amount, implies that preferences are homothetic, and, in particular, that the
optimal guarantee choice g￿ is invariant to initial wealth w0. This greatly simpli￿es our analysis,
as it means that the optimal annuity choice is independent of starting wealth w0, which we do not
directly observe. In the robustness section, we show that our welfare estimates are robust to an
extension of the baseline model in which we allow average mortality ￿￿ and average preferences
for wealth after death ￿￿ to vary with a number of proxies for annuitant socioeconomic status
which we observe. We also show that the results are robust to an alternative model that allows for
13non-homothetic preferences in which wealthier individuals care more, at the margin, about wealth
after death.
In summary, in our baseline speci￿cation we estimate six structural parameters: the ￿ve parame-
ters of the joint distribution of ￿i and ￿i, and the shape parameter ￿ of the Gompertz distribution.
We use external data to impose values for other parameters in the model. First, since we do not
directly observe the fraction of wealth annuitized ￿, we use market-wide evidence that for indi-
viduals with compulsory annuity payments, about one-￿fth of income (and therefore presumably
of wealth) comes from the compulsory annuity (Banks and Emmerson, 1999); in the robustness
section we discuss what the rest of the annuitants￿wealth portfolio may look like and how this may
a⁄ect our counterfactual calculations. Second, as we will discuss in Section 4, we use the data to
guide us regarding the choice of values for discount and interest rates. Finally, we use ￿ = 3 as
the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion.5 In the robustness section we explore the sensitivity of the
results to the imposed values of all these parameters.
Figure 1 presents a stylized, graphical illustration of the optimal guarantee choice in the space
of ￿i and ￿i. We will present our actual estimates of the optimal guarantee choices in the space
of ￿i and ￿i in Section 5 (see Figure 2). The optimal guarantee choices depend on the annuity
prices (which we discuss in Section 4), the guarantee choice model, and the foregoing assumptions
regarding the calibrated parameters. The optimal guarantee choices do not depend on the estimated
parameters, except that in practice we ￿rst estimate ￿ (the shape parameter of the Gompertz
hazard) using only the mortality data and then estimate the optimal guarantee choices given our
estimate of ￿. We discuss this in more detail below.
Figure 1 shows that low values of both ￿i and ￿i imply a small incentive to purchase a guar-
antee, while high values imply that choosing the maximal guarantee length (10 years) is optimal.
Intermediate values imply a choice of a 5 year guarantee. Thus, the optimal guarantee choice can be
characterized by two indi⁄erence sets, those values of ￿i and ￿i for which individuals are indi⁄erent
between purchasing 0 and 5 year guarantee, and those values that make them indi⁄erent between
5 and 10 years.
We estimate the model using maximum likelihood. Here we provide only a general overview;
Appendix B provides more details. The likelihood depends on the (possibly truncated) observed















where F(￿) is the marginal distribution of ￿i, F(￿j￿) is the conditional distribution of ￿i, ￿ is the
Gompertz shape parameter, Pr(mij￿;￿) is given by the Gompertz distribution, 1(￿) is the indicator
function, and the value of the indicator function is given by the guarantee choice model. Given the
5A long line of simulation literature uses a base case value of 3 for the risk aversion coe¢ cient (see e.g. Hubbard,
Skinner, and Zeldes, 1995; Engen, Gale, and Uccello, 1999; Mitchell et al., 1999; Scholz, Seshadri, and Khitatrakun,
2003; and Davis, Kubler, and Willen, 2006). However, a substantial consumption literature, summarized in Laibson,
Repetto, and Tobacman (1998), has found risk aversion levels closer to 1, as did Hurd￿ s (1989) study among the
elderly. In contrast, other papers report higher levels of risk aversion (Barsky et al. 1997; Palumbo, 1999).
14model and conditional on the value of ￿, the inner integral is simply an ordered probit, where the
cuto⁄points are given by the location in which a vertical line in Figure 1 crosses the two indi⁄erence
sets. Estimation is more complex since ￿ is not observed, and therefore needs to be integrated out.
The primary computational di¢ culty in maximizing the likelihood is that, in principle, each
evaluation of the likelihood requires us to resolve the guarantee choice model and compute these
cuto⁄points for a continuum of values of ￿. Since the model is solved numerically, this is not trivial.
Thus, instead of recalculating these cuto⁄s at every evaluation of the likelihood, we calculate the
cuto⁄s on a large grid of values of ￿ only once and then interpolate to evaluate the likelihood.
Unfortunately, since the cuto⁄s also depend on ￿, this method does not allow us to estimate ￿
jointly with all the other parameters. We could calculate the cuto⁄s on a grid of values of both ￿
and ￿, but this would increase computation time substantially. Instead, at some loss of e¢ ciency,
but not of consistency, we ￿rst estimate ￿ using only the mortality portion of the likelihood. We
then ￿x ￿ at this estimate, calculate the cuto⁄s, and estimate the remaining parameters from the
full likelihood above. We bootstrap the data to obtain the correct standard errors.
3.4 Identi￿cation
Identi￿cation of the model is conceptually similar to that of Cohen and Einav (2007). It is easiest to
convey the intuition by thinking about estimation in two steps. Given our assumption of no moral
hazard, we can estimate the marginal distribution of mortality rates (i.e., ￿￿ and ￿￿) from mortality
data alone. We estimate mortality fully parametrically, assuming a Gompertz baseline hazard with
a shape parameter ￿, and lognormally distributed heterogeneity in the location parameter ￿. One
can think of ￿￿ as being identi￿ed by the overall mortality rate in the data, and ￿￿ as being
identi￿ed by the way it changes with age. That is, the Gompertz assumption implies that the log
of the mortality hazard rate is linear, at the individual level. Heterogeneity in mortality rates will
translate into a concave log hazard graph, as, over time, lower mortality individuals are more likely
to survive. The more concave the log hazard is in the data, the higher our estimate of ￿￿ will be.6
Once the marginal distribution of (ex ante) mortality rates is identi￿ed, the other parameters of
the model are identi￿ed by the guarantee choices, and by how they correlate with observed mortality.
Given an estimate of the marginal distribution of ￿, the ex post mortality experience can be mapped
into a distribution of (ex ante) mortality rates; individuals who die sooner are more likely (from
the econometrician￿ s perspective) to be of higher (ex ante) mortality rates. By integrating over
this conditional (on the individual￿ s mortality outcome) distribution of ex ante mortality rates,
the model predicts the likelihood of a given individual choosing a particular guarantee length.
6We make these parametric assumptions for practical convenience. In principle, to estimate the model we need to
make a parametric assumption about either the baseline hazard (as in Heckman and Singer, 1984) or the distribution
of heterogeneity (as in Heckman and Honore, 1989; Han and Hausman, 1990; and Meyer, 1990), but do not have
to make both. For our welfare analysis, however, a parametric assumption about the baseline hazard is required
in the context of our data because, as will become clear in the next section, we do not observe mortality beyond a
certain age. In the robustness section we show that our welfare estimates are not sensitive to alternative parametric
assumptions about the baseline hazard or the distribution of heterogeneity.
15Conditional on the individual￿ s (ex ante) mortality rate, individuals who choose longer guarantees
are more likely (from the econometrician￿ s perspective) to place a higher value on wealth after
death (i.e. have a higher ￿).
Thus, we can condition on ￿ and form the conditional probability of a guarantee length,
P(gi = gj￿), from the data. Our guarantee choice model above allows us to recover the conditional
cumulative distribution function of ￿ evaluated at the indi⁄erence cuto⁄s from these probabilities:
P(gi = 0j￿) = F￿j￿(￿ ￿0;5(￿;￿)) (18)
P(gi = 0j￿) + P(gi = 5j￿) = F￿j￿(￿ ￿5;10(￿;￿))
An additional assumption is needed to translate these points of the cumulative distribution into
the entire conditional distribution of ￿. Accordingly, we assume that ￿ is lognormally distributed
conditional on ￿. Given this assumption, we could allow a fully nonparametric relationship between
the conditional mean and variance of ￿ and ￿. However, in practice, only about one-￿fth of
individuals die within the sample, and daily variation does not provide su¢ cient information to
strongly di⁄erentiate ex ante mortality rates. Consequently, we assume that the conditional mean
of log￿ is a linear function of log￿ and the conditional variance of log￿ is constant (i.e. when
￿ is lognormally distributed, ￿ and ￿ are joint lognormally distributed). For the same reason of
practicality, using the guarantee choice to inform us about the mortality rate is also important,
and we estimate all the parameters (except for ￿) jointly, rather than in two separate steps.7
The joint estimation of guarantee choices and mortality has an additional conceptual advantage.
While, in principle, backing out the distribution of mortality rates from mortality data alone could
have led us to infer that individuals do not vary in their mortality rates,8 the existing conditional
correlation between guarantee choices and mortality (described in Section 4) rules out this possi-
bility in the joint estimation. Joint estimation forces the estimated parameters to rationalize this
correlation by estimating the existence of unobserved heterogeneity in mortality rates.
Our assumption of no moral hazard is important for identi￿cation. When moral hazard exists,
the individual￿ s mortality experience becomes a function of the guarantee choice, as well as ex-
ante mortality rate, so that we could not simply use observed mortality experience to estimate
(ex ante) mortality rate. The assumption of no moral hazard seems reasonable in our context.
While Philipson and Becker (1998) note that in principle the presence of annuity income may
a⁄ect individual e⁄orts to extend length of life, they suggest that such e⁄ects are more likely to be
important among poorer individuals; U.K. annuitants are disproportionately wealthier than typical
individuals in the population (Banks and Emmerson, 1999). Moreover, the quantitative importance
of any moral hazard e⁄ect is likely to be further attenuated in the U.K. annuity market, where
7For similar reasons, it is also important to observe the guarantee choice from three, rather than two alternatives.
In principle, the model is identi￿ed from a binary guarantee choice and variation in ex post mortality. However,
because the set of indi⁄erent individuals is very close to linear (Figure 2), identi￿cation in practice relies on a third
guarantee option.
8This would be the case if the model of mortality risk at the individual level replicated the shape of observed
mortality in the population.
16annuity income represents only about one-￿fth of annual income (Banks and Emmerson, 1999). In
the concluding section we discuss how our approach can be extended to estimating the e¢ ciency
costs of asymmetric information in other insurance markets in which moral hazard is likely to be
empirically important.
While we estimate the average level and heterogeneity of mortality (￿i) and preferences for
wealth after death (￿i), we choose values for the remaining parameters of the model based on
standard assumptions in the literature or external data relevant to our particular setting. In prin-
ciple, we could estimate some of these remaining parameters, such as the coe¢ cient of relative risk
aversion. However, they would be identi￿ed solely by functional form assumptions. We therefore
consider it preferable to choose reasonable calibrated values, rather than impose a functional form
that would generate these reasonable values. In the robustness section we revisit our choices and
show that other reasonable choices yield similar estimates of the welfare cost of asymmetric infor-
mation or government mandates. Di⁄erent choices do, of course, a⁄ect our estimate of average ￿,
which is one additional reason we caution against placing much weight on a structural interpretation
of this parameter.
Relatedly, we estimate preference heterogeneity over wealth after death, but assume individuals
are homogeneous in other preferences. Some of the preference heterogeneity that we estimate in
wealth after death may re￿ ect heterogeneity in other preferences, such as risk aversion or discount
rates; it might also re￿ ect heterogeneity in annuitant characteristics that we do not directly observe.
Since we are agnostic about the underlying structural interpretation of our estimated heterogeneity
in ￿, this is not a problem per se. However, we might be concerned that allowing for other
dimensions of heterogeneity could a⁄ect our estimates of the welfare costs of asymmetric information
or of government mandates. Therefore, in the robustness section we show that our welfare estimates
are robust to alternative models of heterogeneity in ￿, including richer heterogeneity than in the
baseline speci￿cation. Since the various preference parameters are not separately identi￿ed, allowing
for richer heterogeneity in ￿ is similar to allowing for some heterogeneity in these other parameters.9
We also show that our welfare estimates are not sensitive to an alternative model in which we allow
for heterogeneity in risk aversion (￿) rather than in preferences for wealth after death (￿):
4 Data
We have annuitant-level data from one of the largest annuity providers in the U.K. The data contain
each annuitant￿ s guarantee choice, several demographic characteristics, and subsequent mortality.
9To see this, consider for example possible heterogeneity in the risk aversion parameter ￿ (a case which, in fact,
we explore in the robustness section). Preference heterogeneity is only identi￿ed from the guarantee choice, so that
for any pair of ￿i and ￿i that leads to a certain guarantee choice (for a given ￿i) there is a value of ￿i alone (and a
calibrated value for ￿) that would lead to the same choice. Thus, allowing richer heterogeneity in ￿, with possibly
richer correlation with ￿, would ￿t the data just as well as allowing heterogeneity in both ￿ and ￿. Of course,
the assumptions regarding heterogeneity may a⁄ect our welfare estimates. Therefore in the robustness analysis we
explore several alternative models of heterogeneity and show that our welfare estimaets are not sensitive to these
assumptions.
17Annuitant characteristics and guarantee choices appear generally comparable to market-wide data
(Murthi et al., 1999) and to another large ￿rm (Finkelstein and Poterba, 2004). The data consist
of all annuities sold between January 1, 1988 and December 31, 1994 for which the annuitant is
still alive on January 1, 1998. We observe age (in days) at the time of annuitization, the gender of
the annuitant, and the subsequent date of death if it the annuitant died before December 31, 2005.
For analytical tractability, we restrict our sample to 60 or 65 year old annuity buyers who have
been accumulating their pension fund with our company, and who purchased a single life annuity
(that insures only his or her own life) with a constant (nominal) payment pro￿le. Appendix C
discusses these various restrictions in more detail; they are all made so that we can focus on the
purchase decisions of a relatively homogenous subsample.
Table 2 presents summary statistics for the whole sample and for each of the four age-gender
cells. Sample sizes range from a high of almost 5,500 for 65 year old males to a low of 651 for
65 year old females. About 87 percent of annuitants choose a 5 year guarantee period, 10 percent
choose no guarantee, and about 3 percent choose the 10 year guarantee.
Given our sample construction, we can observe mortality at ages 63 to 83. About one-￿fth of
our sample dies between 1998 and 2005. As expected, death is more common among men than
women, and among those who purchase at older ages.
There is also a general pattern of higher mortality among those who purchase 5 year guarantees
than those who purchase 0 guarantees, but no clear pattern (presumably due to the smaller sample
size) of mortality di⁄erences for those who purchase 10 year guarantees relative to either of the
other two options. This mortality pattern as a function of guarantee persists in more formal
hazard modeling that takes account of the left truncation and right censoring of the data (not
shown). As discussed earlier, the existence of a (conditional) correlation between guarantee choice
and mortality ￿such as the higher mortality experienced by purchasers of the 5 year guarantee
relative to purchasers of the 0 year guarantee ￿indicates the presence of private information about
individual mortality risk in our data, and motivates our exercise. Finkelstein and Poterba (2004,
2006) provide a more formal analysis of the detection of adverse selection in these data, and in
other data from the same market.
The company supplied us with the menu of annual annuity payments per $1 of annuity premium.
Payments depend on date of purchase, age at purchase, gender, and length of guarantee. There are
essentially no quantity discounts, so that the annuity rate for each guarantee choice can be fully
characterized by the annuity payment per $1 annuitized.10 All of these components of the pricing
structure, which is standard in the market, are in our data.11 Table 3 shows the annuity payment
rates (per pound annuitized) by age and gender for di⁄erent guarantee choices from January 1992;
this corresponds to roughly the middle of the sales period we study (1988-1994) and are roughly in
the middle of the range of rates over the period. Annuity rates decline, of course, with the length
of guarantee. If they did not, the purchase of a longer guarantee would always dominate. Thus,
10A rare exception on quantity discounts is made for individuals who annuitize an extremely large amount.
11See Finkelstein and Poterba (2004) for one more ￿rm in this market which uses the same pricing structure and
Finkelstein and Poterba (2002) for a description of pricing practices in the market as a whole.
18for example, a 65 year old male in 1992 faced a choice among a 0 guarantee with a payment rate of
13.30 pence per $1, a 5 year guarantee with a payment rate of 12.87 pence per $1, and a 10 year
guarantee with a payment rate of 11.98 pence per $1. The magnitude of the rate di⁄erences across
guarantee options closely tracks expected mortality. For example, our mortality estimates (which
we discuss in more detail in the next section) imply that for 60 year old females the probability of
dying within a guarantee period of 5 and 10 years is about 4.3 and 11.4 percent, respectively, while
for 65 year old males these probabilities are about 7.4 and 18.9 percent. Consequently, as shown in
Table 3, the annuity rate di⁄erences across guarantee periods are much larger for 65 year old males
than they are for 60 year old females.
The ￿rm did not change its pricing policy over our sample of annuity sales. Changes in nominal
payment rates over time re￿ ect changes in interest rates. To use such variation in annuity rates
in estimating the model would require assumptions about how the interest rate that enters the
individual￿ s value functions covaries with the interest rate faced by the ￿rm, and whether the indi-
vidual￿ s discount rate covaries with these interest rates. Absent any clear guidance on these issues,
we analyze the choice problem with respect to one particular pricing menu. For our benchmark
model we use the January 1992 menu shown in Table 3. In the robustness analysis, we show that
the welfare estimates are virtually identical if we choose pricing menus (and corresponding interest
rates, as discussed below) from other points in time; this is not surprising since the relative payouts
across guarantee choices is quite stable over time. For this reason, the results hardly change if we
instead estimate a model with time-varying annuity rates, but constant discount factor and interest
rate faced by annuitants (not reported).12
As mentioned in the preceding section, we use the data to guide our choice of interest and
discount rates in the guarantee choice model. For the interest rate we use the real interest rate
corresponding to the in￿ ation-indexed zero-coupon ten-year Bank of England bond, as of the date
of the pricing menu we use (January 1, 1992 in the baseline speci￿cation). Since the annuities make
constant nominal payments, we need an estimate of expected in￿ ation rate ￿ to translate the initial
nominal payment rate shown in Table 3 into the real annuity payout stream in the guarantee choice
model. We use the di⁄erence between the real and nominal interest rates on the zero-coupon ten
year Treasury bonds on the same date to measure the (expected) in￿ ation rate. For our baseline
model, this implies a real interest rate of 0.0426 and an (expected) in￿ ation rate of 0.0498. As is
standard in the literature, we assume the discount rate ￿ equals the real interest rate r.
12Another alternative is to let annuitants￿interest rate and discount rate move in lock with the time-varying risk
free interest rate (which closely tracks nominal annuity rates). However, we found that this speci￿cation did not
￿t the data and model well. In particular, time-varying indivdiual discount rates made the indi⁄erence sets for the
optimal guarantee choice move, over time, a lot more than actual choices, creating practical estimation problems and
suggesting that these assumptions were unlikely to be correct.
195 Estimates and ￿t of the baseline model
5.1 Parameter Estimates
Table 4 shows the parameter estimates. We allow average mortality (that is, ￿￿) and average pref-
erences for wealth after death (that is, ￿￿) to vary based on the individual￿ s gender and age (either
60 or 65) at annuity purchase. We do this because annuity prices vary with these characteristics,
presumably re￿ ecting di⁄erential mortality by gender and age of annuitization; so that our treat-
ment of preferences and mortality is symmetric, we also allow mean preferences to vary on these
same dimensions.
We estimate statistically signi￿cant heterogeneity across individuals, both in their mortality and
in their preference for wealth after death. We estimate a positive correlation (￿) between mortality
and preference for wealth after death. That is, individuals who are more likely to live longer (lower
￿) are likely to care less about wealth after death. This positive correlation may help to reduce the
magnitude of the ine¢ ciency caused by private information about risk type; individuals who select
larger guarantees due to private information about their mortality (i.e. high ￿ individuals) are also
individuals who tend to place a relatively higher value on wealth after death, and for whom the
cost of the guarantee is not as great as it would be if they had relatively low preferences for wealth
after death.
For illustrative purposes, Figure 2 shows random draws from the estimated distribution of log￿
and log￿ for each age-gender cell, juxtaposed over the estimated indi⁄erence sets for that cell.
The results indicate that both mortality and preference heterogeneity are important determinants
of guarantee choice. This is similar to recent ￿ndings in other insurance markets that preference
heterogeneity can be as or more important than private information about risk type in explaining
insurance purchases (Fang, Keane, and Silverman, 2006; Finkelstein and McGarry, 2006; Cohen
and Einav, 2007). As discussed, we refrain from placing a structural interpretation on the ￿
parameter, merely noting that a higher ￿ re￿ ects a larger preference for wealth after death relative
to consumption while alive. Nonetheless, our ￿nding of heterogeneity in ￿ is consistent with other
estimates of heterogeneity in the population in preferences for leaving a bequest (Laitner and Juster,
1996; Kopczuk and Lupton, 2007).
5.2 Model ￿t
Tables 5 and 6 presents some results on the ￿t of the model. We report results both overall
and separately for each age-gender cell. Table 5 shows some results on the in-sample ￿t of the
model. The model ￿ts very closely the probability of choosing each guarantee choice, as well as
the observed probability of dying within our sample period. The model does, however, produce a
monotone relationship between guarantee choice and mortality rate, while the data show a non-
monotone pattern, with individuals who choose a 5 year guarantee period associated with highest
20mortality.13
Table 6 compares our mortality estimates to two di⁄erent external benchmarks. These speak to
the out-of-sample ￿t of our model in two regards: the benchmarks are not taken from the data, and
the calculations use the entire mortality distribution based on the estimated Gompertz mortality
hazard, while our mortality data are right censored. First, the top panel of Table 6 reports the
implications of our estimates for life expectancy. As expected, men have lower life expectancies
than women. Men who purchase annuities at age 65 have higher life expectancies than those who
purchase at age 60, which is what we would expect if age of annuity purchase were unrelated
to mortality. Women who purchase at 65, however, have lower life expectancy than women who
purchase at 60, which may re￿ ect selection in the timing of annuitization, or the substantially
smaller sample size available for 65 year old women. As one way to gauge the magnitude of the
mortality heterogeneity we estimate, Table 6 indicates that in each age-gender cell, there is about
a 1.4 year di⁄erence in life expectancy, at the time of annuitization, between the 5th and 95th
percentile.
The fourth row of Table 6 contains life expectancy estimates for a group of U.K. pensioners
whose mortality experience may serve as a rough proxy for that of U.K. compulsory annuitants.14
We would not expect our life expectancy estimates ￿which are based on the experience of actual
compulsory annuitants in a particular ￿rm ￿to match this rough proxy exactly, but it is reassuring
that they are in a similar ballpark. Our estimated life expectancy is about 2 years higher. This
di⁄erence is not driven by the parametric assumptions, but re￿ ects higher survival probabilities for
our annuitants than our proxy group of U.K. pensioners; this di⁄erence between the groups exists
even within the range of ages for which we observe survival in our data and can compare the groups
directly (not shown).
Second, the bottom of Table 6 presents the average expected present discounted value (EPDV)
of annuity payments implied by our mortality estimates and our assumptions regarding the real
interest rate and the in￿ ation rate. Since each individual￿ s initial wealth is normalized to 100,
of which 20 percent is annuitized, an EPDV of 20 would imply that the company, if it had no
transaction costs, would break even. Note that nothing in our estimation procedure guarantees
that we arrive at reasonable EPDV payments. It is therefore encouraging that for all the four cells,
and for all guarantee choices within these cells, the expected payout is fairly close to 20; it ranges
across the age-gender cells from 19.74 to 20.66. One might be concerned by an average expected
payment that is slightly above 20, which would imply that the company makes negative pro￿ts.
Note, however, that if the e⁄ective interest rate the company uses to discount its future payments
is slightly higher than the risk-free rate of 0.043 that we use in the individual￿ s guarantee choice
model, the estimated EPDV annuity payments would all fall below 20. It is, in practice, likely
13Almost any model of guarantee choice will have a hard time rationalizing this non-monotone pattern of mortality
with guarantee choice. One possibility is that is simply a result of sampling errors, given our small sample size of 10
year guarantee annuitants.
14Exactly how representative the mortality experience of the pensioners is for that of compulsory annuitants is not
clear. See Finkelstein and Poterba (2002) for further discussion of this issue.
21that the insurance company receives a higher return on its capital than the risk free rate, and the
bottom row of Table 6 shows that a slightly higher interest rate of 0.045 would, indeed, break even.
In the robustness section, we show that our welfare estimates are not sensitive to using an interest
rate that is somewhat higher than the risk free rate used in the baseline model.
As another measure of the out of sample ￿t, we examined the optimal consumption trajectories
implied by our parameter estimates and the guarantee choice model. These suggest that most of the
individuals are saving in their retirement (not shown). This seems contrary to most of the empirical
evidence (e.g., Hurd, 1989), although there is evidence consistent with positive wealth accumulation
among the very wealthy elderly (Kopczuk, 2006), and evidence, more generally, that saving behavior
of high wealth individuals may not be representative of the population at large (Dynan, Skinner,
and Zeldes, 2004); individuals in this market are higher wealth than the general U.K. population
(Banks and Emmerson, 1999). In light of these potentially puzzling wealth accumulation results,
we experimented with a variant of the baseline model that allows individuals to discount wealth
after death more steeply than consumption while alive. Speci￿cally, we modi￿ed the consumer








where z is an additional parameter to be estimated. Our benchmark model corresponds to z = 1.
Values of z < 1 imply that individuals discount wealth after death more steeply than consumption
while alive. Such preferences might arise if individuals care more about leaving money to children (or
grandchildren) when the children are younger than when they are older. We ￿nd that the maximum
likelihood value of z is 1; moreover, even values of z relatively close to 1 (such as z = 0:95) are able
to produce more sensible wealth patterns in retirement, but do not have a noticeable e⁄ect on our
core welfare estimates.
6 Welfare estimates
We now take our parameter estimates as inputs in calculating the welfare consequences of asym-
metric information and government mandates. We start by de￿ning the welfare measure we use,
and calculating welfare in the observed, asymmetric information equilibrium. We then perform
two counterfactual exercises in which we compare equilibrium welfare to what would arise under
symmetric information and under a mandatory social insurance program that does not permit
choice over guarantee. Although we focus primarily on the average welfare, we also brie￿ y discuss
distributional implications.
6.1 Measuring welfare
A useful dollar metric for comparing utilities associated with di⁄erent annuity allocations is the
notion of wealth-equivalent. The wealth-equivalent denotes the amount of initial wealth that an
individual would require in the absence of an annuity, in order to be as well o⁄ as with his initial
22wealth and his annuity allocation. The wealth-equivalent of an annuity with guarantee period g
and initial wealth of w0 is the implicit solution to
V
A(g)
0 (w0) ￿ V NA
0 (wealth ￿ equivalent) (20)
where both V
A(g)
0 (￿) and V NA
0 (￿) are de￿ned in Section 3. This measure, which is commonly used
in the annuity literature (e.g., Mitchell et al., 1999, Davido⁄ et al., 2005), is roughly analogous to
an equivalent variation measure in applied welfare analysis.
A higher value of wealth-equivalent corresponds to a higher value of the annuity contract. If the
wealth equivalent is less than initial wealth, the individual would prefer not to purchase an annuity.
More generally, the di⁄erence between the wealth-equivalent and the initial wealth is the amount
an individual is willing to pay in exchange for having access to the annuity contract. This di⁄erence
is always positive for a risk averse individual who does not care about wealth after death and faces
an actuarially fair annuity price. It can take negative values if the annuity contract is over-priced
(compared to the individual-speci￿c actuarially fair price) or if the individual su¢ ciently values
wealth after death.
Our estimate of the average wealth-equivalent in the observed equilibrium provides a monetary
measure of the welfare gains (or losses) from annuitization given equilibrium prices and individuals￿
contract choices. The di⁄erence between the average wealth equivalent in the observed equilibrium
and in a counterfactual allocation provides a measure of the welfare di⁄erence between these allo-
cations. We provide two ways to quantify these welfare di⁄erence. First, we provide an absolute
monetary estimate of the welfare gain or loss associated with a particular counterfactual scenario.
To do this, we scale the di⁄erence in wealth equivalents by the $6 billion which are annuitized
annually (in 1998) in the U.K. annuity market (Association of British Insurers, 1999). Since the
wealth equivalents are reported per 100 units of initial wealth and we assume that 20 percent of this
wealth is annuitized, this implies that each unit of wealth equivalent is equivalent, at the aggregate,
to $300 million annually.
While an absolute welfare measure may be a relevant benchmark for policies associated with
the particular market we study, a relative measure may be more informative when considering
using our estimates as a possible benchmark in other contexts. For example, if we considered the
decision to buy a one month guarantee, we would not expect e¢ ciency costs associated with this
decision to be large relative to life-time wealth. A relative welfare estimate essentially requires a
normalization factor. Thus, to put these welfare estimates in perspective, we measure the welfare
changes relative to how large this welfare change could have been, given the observed equilibrium
prices. We refer to this maximal potential welfare change as the ￿Maximal Money at Stake,￿ or
MMS. We de￿ne the MMS as the minimum lump sum that individuals would have to receive to
insure them against the possibility that they receive their least-preferred allocation in the observed
equilibrium, given the observed equilibrium pricing. The MMS is therefore the additional amount
of pre-existing wealth an individual requires so that they receive the same annual annuity payment
if they purchase the maximum guarantee length (10) as they would receive if they purchase the
minimum guarantee length (0). The nature of the thought experiment behind the MMS is that the
23welfare loss from buying a 10 year guarantee is bounded by the lower annuity payment that the
individual receives as a result. This maximal welfare loss would occur in the worst case scenario,
in which the individual had no chance of dying during the ￿rst 10 years (or alternatively, no value









where z0 and z10 denote the annual annuity rates for 0 and 10 year guarantees, respectively (see
Table 3). A key property of the MMS is that it depends only on prices, but not on our estimates
of preferences or risk type.15
6.2 Welfare in observed equilibrium
The ￿rst row of Table 7 shows the estimated average wealth equivalents per 100 units of initial
wealth in the observed allocations implied by our parameter estimates. The average wealth equiv-
alent for our sample is 100.16, and ranges from 99.9 (for 65 year old males) to 100.4 (for 65 year
old females). An average wealth equivalent of less than 100 indicates an average welfare loss asso-
ciated with the equilibrium annuity allocations relative to a case in which wealth is not annuitized;
conversely, an average wealth equivalent of more than 100 indicates an average welfare gain from
the annuity equilibrium. Note that because annuitization of some form is compulsory, it is possible
that individuals in this market would prefer not to annuitize.16
Figure 3 shows the distribution across di⁄erent types of the welfare gains and losses in the
observed annuity equilibrium, relative to no annuities. This ￿gure super-imposes iso-welfare contour
lines over the same scatter plots presented in Figure 2. It indicates that, as expected, the individuals
who bene￿t the most from the annuity market are those with low mortality (low ￿) and weak
preference for wealth after death (low ￿). The former are high (survival) risk, who face better
than actuarially fair prices when they are pooled with the rest of the annuitants. The latter are
individuals who get less disutility from dying without much wealth, which is more likely to occur
with than without annuities.
15An analogous MMS measure in a standard insurance context would be the di⁄erence between the price (premium)
of the highest level of coverage and the price (premium) of the lowest level of coverage.
16Our average wealth equivalent is noticeably lower than what has been calculated in the previous literature (e.g.
Mitchell et al., 1999; Davido⁄ et al., 2005). The high wealth equivalents in these papers in turn implies a very high
rate of voluntary annuitization, giving rise to what is known as the ￿annuity puzzle￿ since, empirically, very few
individuals voluntarily purchase annuities (see Brown et al. (2001) for a review). Our substantially lower wealth
equivalents ￿which persist in the robustness analysis (see Table 8) ￿arise because of the relatively high ￿ that we
estimate. Previous papers have calibrated rather than estimaed ￿ and assumed it to be 0. If we set log￿ = ￿￿ and
￿ = 0, and also assume ￿like these other papers ￿that annuitization is full (i.e., 100 percent vs. 20 percent in our
benchmark), then we ￿nd that the wealth equivalent of a zero year guarantee for a 65 year old male rises to 135.9,
which is much closer to the wealth equivalent of 156 reported by Davido⁄ et al. (2005).
246.3 The Welfare Cost of Asymmetric Information
In the counterfactual symmetric information equilibrium, each person faces an actuarially fair
adjustment to annuity rates depending on her mortality. Speci￿cally, we o⁄er each person payment
rates such that the EPDV of payments for that person for each guarantee length is equal to the
equilibrium average EPDV of payments. This ensures that each person faces a risk-type speci￿c
actuarially fair reductions in payments in exchange for longer guarantees. Note that this calculation
is (expected) revenue neutral, preserving any average load (or subsidy) in the market. Figure 2
may provide a visual way to think about this counterfactual. In the counterfactual exercise, the
points in Figure 2, which represent individuals, are held constant, while the indi⁄erence sets, which
represent the optimal choices at a given set of annuity rates, shift. Wealth equivalents are di⁄erent
at the new optimal choices both because of the direct e⁄ect of the di⁄erent annuity rates and
because these rates in turn a⁄ect optimal contract choices.
The second panel of Table 7 presents our estimates of the welfare cost of asymmetric information.
The ￿rst row shows our estimated wealth-equivalents in the symmetric information counterfactual.
As expected, welfare is systematically higher in the counterfactual world of symmetric information.
For 65 year old males, for example, the estimates indicate that the average wealth equivalent is
100.74 under symmetric information, compared to 100.17 under asymmetric information. This
implies that the average welfare loss associated with asymmetric information is equivalent to 0.57
units of initial wealth. For the other three age-gender cells, this number ranges from 0.14 to 0.27.
Weighting all cells by their relative sizes, we obtain the overall estimate reported in the introduction
of annual welfare costs of $127 million, or about 2 percent of annual annuity premiums. This also
amounts to 0.25 of the concept of maximal money at stake (MMS) introduced earlier.
What is the cause of this welfare loss? It arises from the distortion in the individual￿ s choice
of guarantee length relative to what he would have chosen under symmetric information pricing.
Despite preference heterogeneity, we estimate that under symmetric information all individuals
would choose 10 year guarantees (not shown). However, in the observed equilibrium only about 3
percent of individuals purchase these annuities. This illustrates the distortions in optimal choices
in the observed equilibrium.
To illustrate the impact on di⁄erent individuals, Figure 4 presents contour graphs of the changes
in wealth equivalents associated with the change to symmetric information. That is, as before, for
each age-gender cell we plot the individuals as points in the space of log￿ and log￿, and then draw
contour lines over them. All the individuals along a contour line are predicted to have the same
absolute welfare change as a result of the counterfactual. Figure 4 indicates that, while almost all
individuals bene￿t from a move to the ￿rst best, there is signi￿cant heterogeneity in the welfare
gains arising from individual-speci￿c pricing. The biggest welfare gains accrue to individuals with
high mortality (high ￿) and high preferences for wealth after death (high ￿).
Two di⁄erent factors work in the same direction to produce the highest welfare gains for high
￿, high ￿ individuals. First, a standard one-dimensional heterogeneity setting would predict that
symmetric information would improve welfare for low risk (high ￿) individuals relative to high risk
25(low ￿) individuals. Second, the asymmetric information equilibrium involves cross-subsidies from
higher guarantees to lower guarantees (the EPDV of payout decreases with the length of the guar-
antee period, as shown in Table 6);17 by eliminating these cross-subsidies, symmetric information
also improves the welfare of high ￿ individuals, who place more value on higher guarantees. Since
we estimate that ￿ and ￿ are positively correlated, these two forces reinforce each other.
A related question concerns the extent to which our estimate of the welfare cost of asymmetric
information is in￿ uenced by re-distributional e⁄ects. As just discussed, symmetric information
produces di⁄erent welfare gains for individuals with di⁄erent ￿ and ￿. To investigate the extent to
which our welfare comparisons are a⁄ected by the changes in cross-subsidy patterns, we recalculated
wealth-equivalents in the symmetric information counterfactual under the assumption that each
individual faces the same expected payments for each option in the choice set of the counterfactual
as she receives at her choice in the observed equilibrium. The results (which, to conserve space, we
do not present) suggest that, in all the age-gender cells, our welfare estimates are not, in practice,
a⁄ected by redistribution.
6.4 The Welfare Consequences of Government Mandated Annuity Contracts
Although symmetric information is a useful conceptual benchmark, it may not be relevant from
a policy perspective since it ignores the information constraints faced by the social planner. We
therefore consider the welfare consequences of government intervention in this market. Speci￿cally,
we consider the consequences of government mandates that each individual purchases the same
guarantee length, eliminating any contract choice; as noted previously, such mandates are the
canonical solution to adverse selection in insurance markets (e.g. Akerlof, 1970).18 To evaluate
welfare under alternative mandates, we calculate average wealth equivalents when all people are
forced to have the same guarantee period and annuity rate, and compare them to the average
wealth equivalents in the observed equilibrium. We set the payment rate such that average EPDV
of payments is the same as in the observed equilibrium; this preserves the average load (or subsidy)
in the market.
The results are presented in the bottom panels of Table 7. In all four age-gender cells, welfare
is lowest under a mandate with no guarantee period, and highest under a mandate of a 10 year
guarantee. Welfare under a mandate of a 5 year guarantee is similar to welfare in the observed
equilibrium. The increase in welfare from a mandate of 10 year guarantee is virtually identical to the
17The observed cross-subsidies across guarantee choices may be due to asymmetric information. For example,
competitive models of pure adverse selection (with no preference heterogeneity), such as Miyazaki (1977) and Spence
(1978), can produce equilibria with cross-subsidies from the policies with less insurance (in our context, longer
guarantees) to those with more insurance (in our context, shorter guarantees). We should note that the observed cross
subsidies may also arise from varying degrees of market power in di⁄erent guarantee options. In such cases, symmetric
information may not eliminate cross-subsides, and our symmetric information counterfactual would therefore con￿ ate
the joint e⁄ects of elimination of informational asymmetries and of market power. Our analysis of the welfare
consequences of government mandates in the next subsection does not su⁄er from this same limitation.
18We do not consider other potential governmennt interventions ￿such as taxation of insurance products or man-
dates with residual choice ￿as these would require that we model the supply side of the private market.
26increase in welfare associated with the ￿rst best, symmetric information outcome reported earlier.
This mandate involves no allocative ine¢ ciency, since we estimated that a 10 year guarantee is the
￿rst best allocation for all individuals. Although it does involve transfers (through the common
pooled price) across individuals of di⁄erent risk types, these do not appear to have much e⁄ect
on our welfare estimate.19 Consistent with this, when we recalculated wealth-equivalents in each
counterfactual under the assumption that each individuals faces the same expected payments in the
counterfactual as she receives from her choice in the observed equilibrium, our welfare estimates
were not noticeably a⁄ected (not shown). As with the counterfactual of symmetric information,
there is heterogeneity in the welfare e⁄ects of the di⁄erent mandates for individuals with di⁄erent
￿ and ￿. Not surprisingly, high ￿ individuals bene￿t relatively more from the 10 year mandate
and lose relatively more from the 0 year mandate, while welfare e⁄ects of the 5 year mandate are
relatively similar for di⁄erent individuals (not shown).
Our ￿ndings highlight both the potential bene￿ts and the potential dangers from government
mandates. Without estimating the joint distribution of risk type and preferences, it would not have
been apparent that a 10 year guarantee is the welfare-maximizing mandate, let alone that such a
mandate comes close to achieving the ￿rst best outcome. Were the government to mandate no
guarantee period, it would reduce welfare by about $107 million per year, achieving a welfare loss
of about equal and opposite magnitude to the $127 million per year welfare gain from the optimal
ten year guarantee mandate. Were the government to pursue the naive approach of mandating
the currently most popular choice (5 year guarantees) our estimates suggest that this would raise
welfare by only about $2 million per year, foregoing most of the welfare gains achievable from the
welfare maximizing ten year mandate. These results highlight the practical di¢ culties involved in
trying to design mandates to achieve social welfare gains.
7 Robustness
In this section, we explore the robustness of our ￿ndings. In particular, we focus on the robustness
of our estimated welfare cost of asymmetric information and welfare consequences of mandated
guarantee lengths to various assumptions. Table 8 provides a summary of the main results. Our
welfare estimates are reasonably stable across a range of alternative assumptions. The ￿nding that
the welfare maximizing mandate is a 10 year guarantee, and that this mandate achieves virtually
the same welfare as the ￿rst best outcome, persists across alternative speci￿cations, as does the
discrepancy between the welfare gain from a 10 year guarantee mandate and the welfare loss from
mandating no guarantee. The welfare cost of symmetric information, which is $127 million per
year (i.e. two percent of annual premiums) in our baseline speci￿cation, ranges from $111 million
19We estimate that welfare is slightly higher under the 10 year mandate than under the symmetric information
equilibrium (in which everyone chooses the 10 year guarantee). This presumably re￿ ects the fact that under the
mandated (pooling) annuity payout rates, consumption is higher for low mortality individuals and lower for high
mortality individuals than it would be under the symmetric information annuity payout rates. Since low mortality
individuals have lower consumption in each period and hence higher marginal utility of consumption, this transfer
improves social welfare (given the particular social welfare measure we use).
27to $144 million per year (or from 1.85 to 2.4 percent of annual premiums) across all but one of a
wide range of alternative speci￿cations. The biggest change in our welfare estimates comes when
we modify the baseline case to assume that, in addition to the 20 percent of wealth in a private
annuity, 50 percent of wealth is in a publicly provided annuity; under this scenario our estimate
of the e¢ ciency cost of asymmetric information increases to $256 million per year (4.3 percent of
annual premiums). We discuss possible intuition for this ￿nding below.
The general lack of sensitivity of our welfare estimates to particular assumptions is worth
contrasting with the greater sensitivity of other estimated quantities (e.g., the magnitude of the
average ￿) to these alternative assumptions. The fact that our estimated parameters change as
we vary certain assumptions means that it is not a priori obvious how our welfare estimates will
change (in either sign or magnitude). For example, although it may seem surprising that welfare
estimates are not very sensitive to our assumption about the risk aversion parameter, recall that
the estimated parameters also change with the change in the assumption about risk aversion.
The change in the estimated parameters across speci￿cations is also important for the overall
interpretation of our ￿ndings. As noted earlier, one reason we hesitate to place much weight on
the structural interpretation of the estimated parameters (or the extent of heterogeneity in these
parameters) is that their estimates will be a⁄ected by our assumptions about other parameters
(such as risk aversion or discount rate). This is closely related to the discussion of identi￿cation
in Section 3. However, the fact that our key welfare estimates are relatively insensitive across
speci￿cations suggests that our parameter estimates adjust in an o⁄setting manner in response to
changes in other assumptions. Thus, the main message of our robustness analysis is that while some
of our assumptions may be important for the structural interpretation of the estimated parameters,
they are less important for our welfare analysis, which is the focus of the paper.
7.1 Parameter choices
Following our discussion of identi￿cation in Section 3, although we estimate the average level and
heterogeneity in mortality (￿i) and in preferences for wealth after death (￿i), we choose values
for a number of other parameters based on external information. While we could, in principle,
estimate some of these parameters, they would be identi￿ed solely by functional form assumptions.
Therefore, we instead chose to explore how our welfare estimates are a⁄ected by alternative choices
for these parameters.
Choice of risk aversion coe¢ cient (￿) Our baseline speci￿cation (reproduced in row 1 of
Table 8) assumes a (common) CRRA parameter of ￿ = 3 for both the utility from consumption u(c)
and from wealth after death b(w). Rows 2 and 3 of Table 8 show that the results are quite similar
if instead we assume ￿ = 5 or ￿ = 1:5. For example, the welfare cost of asymmetric information
falls from $127 million per year in the baseline speci￿cation to $111 million when ￿ = 5 and rises
to $133 million when ￿ = 1:5.
Rows 4 and 5 report speci￿cations in which we hold constant the CRRA parameter in the utility
28from consumption (at ￿ = 3) but vary the CRRA parameter in the utility from wealth after death.
Speci￿cally, we estimate the model with ￿ = 1:5 or ￿ = 5 for the utility from wealth after death
b(w). Once again, the estimated welfare cost of asymmetric information remains within a relatively
tight band of the baseline.
A downside of these last two speci￿cations is that they give rise to non-homothetic preferences
and are therefore no longer scalable in wealth, so that heterogeneity in initial wealth may confound
the analysis. Therefore, in row 6, we also allow for heterogeneity in initial wealth. As in row 5, we
assume that ￿ = 3 for utility from consumption, but that ￿ = 1:5 for the utility from wealth after
death. This implies that wealth after death acts as a luxury good, with wealthier individuals caring
more, at the margin, about wealth after death. Such a model is consistent with the hypothesis that
bequests are a luxury good, which may help explain the higher rate of wealth accumulation at the
top of the wealth distribution (Dynan, Skinner, and Zeldes, 2004; Kopczuk and Lupton, 2007). To
allow for heterogeneity in initial wealth, we calibrate the distribution of wealth based on Banks
and Emmerson (1999) and integrate over this (unobserved) distribution.20 We also let the means
(but not variances) of ￿ and ￿ to vary with unobserved wealth. The welfare estimates, which are
normalized to be comparable with the other exercises, remain similar.
Choice of other parameters We also reestimated the model assuming a higher interest
rate than in the baseline case. As already mentioned, our estimates suggest that a slightly higher
interest rate than the risk free rate we use in the individual￿ s value function is required to have the
annuity company not lose money. Thus, rather than the benchmark which uses the risk free rate
as of 1992 (r = ￿ = 0:043), we allow for the likely possibility that the insurance company receives a
higher rate of return, and reestimate the model with r = ￿ = 0:05. This in turn implies an average
load on policies of 3.71 percent. The results (in row 7 of Table 8) suggest similar welfare e⁄ects of
asymmetric information and government mandates.
Rows 8 and 9 report results under di⁄erent assumptions of the fractions of wealth annuitized
in the compulsory market (we tried 0.1 and 0.3, compared to 0.2 in the baseline model). Finally,
since the choice of 1992 pricing for our benchmark model was arbitrary, row 10 reports results for
a di⁄erent set of prices, from 1990, with the corresponding in￿ ation and interest rates. In all these
cases the welfare estimates remain fairly stable.
7.2 Parameterization of heterogeneity
Di⁄erent distributional assumptions of heterogeneity We explored the sensitivity of
our welfare estimates to the parameterization of unobserved heterogeneity. One potential issue
concerns our parametric assumption regarding the baseline mortality distribution at the individual
level. As previously discussed (see the discussion of identi￿cation in Section 3), our assumption
about the shape of the individual mortality hazard a⁄ects our estimate of unobserved mortality
20Banks and Emmerson (1999) report that the quartiles of the welath distribution among 60-69 pensioners are
1,750, 8,950, and 24,900 pounds. We assume that the population of retirees is drawn from these three levels, with
probability 37.5%, 25%, and 37.5%, respectively.
29heterogeneity (i.e. ￿￿). To explore the importance of our assumption, row 11 presents results under
a di⁄erent assumption about the mortality distribution at the individual level. In particular, we




h = 1:5, which increases faster over time than the baseline Gompertz speci￿cation (which has the
same form, but h = 1). This, by construction, leads to a higher estimated level of heterogeneity in
mortality, since the baseline hazard is more convex at the individual level. However, the average
welfare is similar.
We also investigated the sensitivity of the results to alternative joint distributional assumptions
than our baseline assumption that ￿ and ￿ are joint lognormally distributed. Due to our estimation
procedure, it is convenient to parameterize the joint distribution of ￿ and ￿ in terms of the marginal
distribution of ￿ and the conditional distribution of ￿. It is common in hazard models with
heterogeneity to assume a gamma distribution (e.g., Han and Hausman, 1990). Accordingly, we
estimate our model assuming that ￿ follows a gamma distribution. We assume that ￿ is either log-
normally or gamma distributed, conditional on ￿. Speci￿cally, let a￿ be the shape parameter and
b￿ be the scale parameter of the marginal distribution of ￿. When ￿ is conditionally log-normally
distributed, its distribution is parameterized as follows:
log(￿)j￿ ￿ N
￿




When ￿ is conditionally gamma distributed, its shape parameter is simply a￿, and its conditional
scale parameter is b￿ = exp
￿
￿￿ + ￿(log(￿) ￿ log(b￿))
￿
. These speci￿cations allow thinner tails,
compared to the bivariate lognormal baseline. Rows 12 and 13 show that the baseline results do
not change by much.
In unreported speci￿cations, we have also experimented with discrete mixtures of lognormal
distributions, in an attempt to investigate the sensitivity of our estimates to the one-parameter
correlation structure of the baseline speci￿cation. These mixtures of lognormal distributions almost
always collapsed back to the single lognormal distribution of the baseline estimates, trivially leading
to almost identical welfare estimates.
Allowing heterogeneity in other parameters While we allow for heterogeneity in mor-
tality (a) and in preference for wealth after death (￿), our baseline speci￿cation does not allow for
heterogeneity in the imposed parameters (risk aversion and discount rate). As in our discussion
of identi￿cation in Section 3, since the various parameters ￿, ￿, ￿ are not separately identi￿ed
in our model (except by functional form), more ￿ exible estimation of ￿ and ￿ is analogous to a
speci￿cation which frees up these other parameters.
One way to e⁄ectively allow for more ￿ exible heterogeneity is to allow the mean of ￿ and ￿
to depend on various observable covariates. In particular, one might expect both mortality and
preferences for wealth after death to vary with an individual￿ s socioeconomic status. We observe
two proxies for the annuitant￿ s socioeconomic status: the amount of wealth annuitized (i.e. the
annuity premium) and the geographic location of the annuitant residence (his or her ward) if the
annuitant is in England or Wales (about 10 percent of our sample is from Scotland). We link the
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1991 UK Census; there is substantial variation across wards in average socioeconomic status of the
population (Finkelstein and Poterba, 2006). Row 14 shows the results of allowing the mean of both
parameters to vary with the premium paid for the annuity and the percent of the annuitant￿ s ward
that has received the equivalent of a high school degree of higher; both of these covariates may
proxy for the socioeconomic status of the annuitant. The results are virtually the same.
We also report results from an alternative model in which ￿in contrast to our baseline model ￿we
assume that individuals are homogenous in their ￿ but heterogeneous in their consumption ￿. Row
15 reports such a speci￿cation, with ￿ ￿xed at its estimated conditional median from the baseline
speci￿cation (see Table 4) and ￿ and the coe¢ cient of risk aversion for utility from consumption
assumed to be heterogeneous and (bivariate) lognormally distributed. The ￿ coe¢ cient in the
utility from wealth after death b(w) is ￿xed at 3. As in row 6, this speci￿cation gives rise to
non-homothetic preferences, so we use the median wealth level from Banks and Emmerson (1999)
and later renormalize, so the reported results are comparable. The welfare estimates do not change
much.
7.3 Wealth portfolio outside of the compulsory annuity market
In our baseline speci￿cation we assumed that 20 percent of the annuitants￿￿nancial wealth is in
the compulsory annuity market, and the rest is in liquid ￿nancial wealth. In row 16, we instead
assume that 50 percent of wealth is annuitized (at actuarially fair prices) through the public Social
Security program.21 We then consider the welfare cost of asymmetric information for the 20 percent
of wealth annuitized in the compulsory market. This alternative assumption has by far the biggest
e⁄ect on our estimate of the welfare cost of asymmetric information, raising it from $127 million
per year (or about 2 percent of annual premiums) in the baseline speci￿cation to $256 million per
year (or about 4 percent of annual premiums). By way of comparison, the next largest estimate of
the welfare cost in an alternative model is only $144 million per year.
As we noted at the outset of this section, it is di¢ cult to develop good intuition for the com-
parative statics across alternative models since the alternative models also yield di⁄erent estimated
parameters. However, one potential explanation for our estimate of a larger welfare cost when 50
percent of wealth is in the public annuity may be that the individual now only has 30 percent of
his wealth available to ￿o⁄set￿any undesirable consumption path generated by the 70 percent of
annuitized wealth.
More generally, a natural question concerns the extent to which annuitants￿ability to adjust
their non-annuitized ￿nancial wealth portfolio a⁄ects our estimates of the e¢ ciency cost of the
21On average in the UK population, about 50 percent of retirees￿wealth is annuitized through the public Social
Security program, although this fraction declines with retiree wealth (O¢ ce of National Statistics, 2006). Compulsory
annuitiants tend to be of higher than average socio-economic status (Banks and Emmerson, 1999) and may therefore
have on average a lower proportion of their wealth annuitized through the public Social Security program. However,
since our purpise is to examine the sensitivity of our welfare estimates to accounting for publicly provided annuities,
we went with the higher estimate to be conservative.
31current asymmetric information equilibrium or the welfare consequences of government mandates.
For example, if individuals could purchase actuarially fair life insurance policies with no load, and
without incurring any transaction costs in purchasing these policies, they could in principle undo
much of the e¢ ciency cost of annuitization in the current asymmetric information equilibrium. As
such, our welfare estimates of the e¢ ciency costs of asymmetric information ￿or of the costs or
gains from alternative mandates ￿may be viewed as an upper bound. Of course, in practice the
ability to o⁄set the equilibrium using other parts of the ￿nancial portfolio will be limited by factors
such as loads and transaction costs. It will also be limited by the fact that much of individuals￿
wealth outside of the compulsory annuity market is tied up in relatively illiquid forms such as
the public pension, and housing. Indeed, the data suggest that for individuals likely to be in the
compulsory annuity market, only about 10 to 15 percent of their total wealth is in the form of
liquid ￿nancial assets (Banks et al., 2005). A rigorous analysis of this is beyond the scope of the
current work, and would probably require better information than we have on the asset allocation
of individual annuitants. More generally, this issue ￿ts into the broader literature that investigates
the possibility and extent of informal insurance to lower the welfare bene￿ts from government
interventions or private insurance (see, e.g., Golosov and Tsyvinski, forthcoming).
7.4 Departing from the neoclassical model
Our baseline model is a standard neoclassical model with fully rational individuals. It is worth
brie￿ y discussing various ￿behavioral￿phenomena that our baseline model (or extensions to it) can
accommodate.
A wide variety of non-standard preferences may be folded into the interpretation for the prefer-
ence for wealth after death parameter ￿. As previously noted, this preference may re￿ ect a standard
bequest motive, or some version of ￿regret￿or ￿peace of mind￿that have been discussed in the
behavioral literature (see, e.g., Braun and Muermann, 2004).
Another possibility we considered is non-traditional explanations for the high fraction of indi-
viduals in our data who choose the 5 year guarantee option. One natural possibility that can be
ruled out is that this re￿ ects an in￿ uence of the 5 year guarantee as the default option. In practice
there is no default for individuals in our sample, all of whom annuitized at age 60 or 65. Individuals
in this market are required to annuitize by age 70 (for women) or 75 (for men). To annuitize before
that age, they must actively ￿ll a form when they decide to annuitize, and must check a chosen
guarantee length. Failure to complete such an active decision would simply delay annuitization
until the maximum allowed age.
Another natural possibility is that the popularity of the 5 year guarantee may partly re￿ ect the
well-known phenomenon in the marketing literature that individuals are more likely to ￿choose the
middle￿(e.g. Simonson and Tversky, 1992). We therefore estimated a speci￿cation of the model
in which we allow for the possibility that some portion of individuals ￿blindly￿choose the middle,
that is the 5 year guarantee option. We allow such individuals to also di⁄er in the mean mortality
rate. Row 17 summarizes the results from such a speci￿cation and shows that the welfare estimates
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Finally, we assumed throughout that individuals know perfectly their ex ante risk type. This is
consistent with empirical evidence that individuals￿perceptions about their mortality probabilities
co-vary in sensible ways with known risk factors, such as age, gender, smoking, and health status
(Hamermesh, 1985; Hurd and McGarry, 2002; Smith et al., 2001). Of course, such work does
not preclude the possibility that individuals also make some form of an error in forecasting their
mortality. We could accommodate an alternative approach in which individuals have some error
in their mortality perceptions, but this would require an arbitrary assumption about the nature of
this error. Similarly, we could also allow for heterogeneity across individuals in the nature of their
errors, but this would be identi￿ed separately from ￿ only by a functional form assumption. In this
sense, we view a model with no errors or biases as the most natural baseline.
7.5 Estimates for a di⁄erent population
As a ￿nal robustness exercise, we re-estimated the baseline model on a distinct sample of annuitants.
As mentioned brie￿ y in Section 4 and discussed in more detail in Appendix C, in our baseline
estimates we limit the annuitant sample to the two-thirds of individuals who have accumulated their
pension fund with our company. Annuitants may choose to purchase their annuity from an insurance
company other than the one in which their funds have been accumulating, and about one-third of
the annuitants in the market choose to do so. As our sample is from a single company, it includes
those annuitants who accumulated their funds with the company and stayed with the company, as
well as those annuitants who brought in external funds. Annuitants who approach the company
with external funds face a di⁄erent pricing menu than those who buy internally. Speci￿cally, the
annuity payment rates are lower by 2.5 pence per pound of annuity premium than the payment
rates faced by ￿internal￿annuitants.23 Annuitants who approach the company with external funds
may also be drawn from a di⁄erent distribution of unobserved risk type and preferences, which is
why we do not include them in our main estimates. The estimated parameters for this population
are, indeed, quite di⁄erent from the estimates we obtain for the internal individuals (not shown).
Row 18 shows the results of estimating the model separately for this distinct group of individuals,
using their distinct pricing menu. The welfare costs of asymmetric information are quite similar:
$137 in this ￿external￿annuitant sample, compared to our baseline estimate of $127 in our sample
of annuitants who are ￿internal￿to our ￿rm. We also continue to ￿nd that the welfare minimizing
mandate is of no guarantee and that the welfare maximizing mandate is a 10 year guarantee, and
it can get very close to the welfare level of the ￿rst best outcome. This gives us some con￿dence
22Welfare of individuals who always choose the middle is not well de￿ned, and the reported results only compute
the welfare for those individuals who are estimated to be ￿rational￿and to choose according to the baseline model.
For comparability with the other speci￿cations, we still scale the welfare estimates by the overall annuitized amount
in the market.
23We found it somewhat puzzling that payout rates are lower for individuals who approach the company with
external funds, and who therefore are more likely to be actively searching across companies. According to the
company executives, some of the explanation lies in the higher administrative costs associated with transferring
external funds, also creating higher incentives to retain internal individuals by o⁄erring them better rates.
33that our results may be more broadly applicable to the UK annuitant population as a whole and
are not idiosyncratic to our particular ￿rm and its pricing menu.
8 Conclusion
This paper represents the ￿rst attempt, to our knowledge, to empirically estimate the welfare costs
of asymmetric information in an insurance market and the welfare consequences of mandatory social
insurance. We began by showing that to estimate these welfare consequences, it is not su¢ cient
to observe the nature of the reduced form equilibrium relationship between insurance coverage and
risk occurrence. If, however, we can recover the joint distribution of risk type and risk preferences,
as well as the equilibrium insurance allocations, then it is possible to make such inferences.
We have performed such an exercise in the speci￿c context of the semi-compulsory U.K. annuity
market. In this market, individuals who save for retirement through certain tax-deferred pension
plans are required to annuitize their accumulated wealth. They are allowed, however, to choose
among di⁄erent types of annuity contracts. This choice simultaneously opens up scope for adverse
selection as well as selection based on preferences over di⁄erent contracts. We estimate that both
private information about risk type and preferences are important in determining the equilibrium
allocation of contracts across individuals. We use our estimates of the joint distribution of risk
types and preferences to calculate welfare under the current allocation and to compare it to welfare
under various counterfactual allocations.
Our results suggest that, relative to a ￿rst-best symmetric information benchmark, the welfare
cost of asymmetric information along the dimension of guarantee choice is about 25 percent of the
maximum money at stake in this choice. These estimates account for about $127 million annually,
or about 2 percent of annual premia in the market. The estimates are quite stable across a range
of alternative assumptions.
We also ￿nd that government mandates that eliminate any choice among annuity contracts do
not necessarily improve on the asymmetric information equilibrium. We estimate that a mandated
annuity contract could increase welfare relative to the current equilibrium by as much as $127
million per year, or could reduce it by as much as $107 million per year, depending on what
contract is mandated. Moreover, the welfare maximizing choice for a mandated contract would
not be apparent to the government without knowledge of the joint distribution of risk type and
preferences. Our results therefore suggest that achieving welfare gains through mandatory social
insurance may be harder in practice than simple theory would suggest.
Although our analysis is speci￿c to the U.K. annuity market, the approach we take can be ap-
plied in other insurance markets. As seen, the data requirements for recovering the joint distribution
of risk type and preferences are data on the menu of choices each individual faces, the contract each
chooses, and a measure of each individual￿ s ex-post risk realization. Such data are often available
from individual surveys or from insurance companies. These data are now commonly used to test
for the presence of asymmetric information in insurance markets, including automobile insurance
(Chiappori and Salanie, 2000; Cohen and Einav, 2007), health insurance (Cardon and Hendel,
342001), and long term care insurance (Finkelstein and McGarry, 2006), as well as annuity markets.
This paper suggests that such data can now also be used to estimate the welfare consequences of
any asymmetric information that is detected.
Our analysis was made substantially easier by the assumption that moral hazard does not exist
in annuity markets. As discussed, this may be a reasonable assumption for the annuity market. It
may also be a reasonable assumption for several other insurance markets. For example, Cohen and
Einav (2007) argue that moral hazard is unlikely to be present over small deductibles in automobile
insurance. Grabowski and Gruber (2005) present evidence that suggests that there is no detectable
moral hazard e⁄ect of long term care insurance on nursing home use. In such markets, the approach
in this paper can be straightforwardly adopted.
In other markets, such as health insurance, moral hazard is likely to play an important role.
Estimation of the e¢ ciency costs of asymmetric information therefore requires some additional
source of variation in the data to separately identify the incentive e⁄ects of the insurance policies.
One natural source would be exogenous changes in the contract menu. Such variation may occur
when regulation requires changes in pricing, or when employers change the menu of health insurance
plans from which their employees can choose.24 Non-linear experience rating schemes may also
introduce useful variation in the incentive e⁄ects of insurance policies (Abbring, Chiappori, and
Pinquet, 2003a; Abbring et al., 2003b; Israel, 2004). We consider the application and extension of
our approach to other markets, including those with moral hazard, an interesting and important
direction for further work.
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A Proofs
Proposition 1: ￿(pi;mi;ri) is increasing in pi, mi, and in ri.




ln(1 ￿ pi + pierimi)
where ri > 0 and pi 2 (0;1). It is straight forward to verify that it is increasing in mi and in pi
(since rimi > 0 so erimi > 1). The more complicated part is to show that ￿(pi;mi;ri) is increasing
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= sign[p(￿ + 1)ln(￿ + 1) ￿ (1 + p￿)ln(1 + p￿)] (25)
Let f(p;￿) ￿ p(￿ + 1)ln(￿ + 1) ￿ (1 + p￿)ln(1 + p￿). We will show that f(p;￿) > 0 for any
￿ > 0 and p 2 (0;1). First, note that f(0;￿) = 0 and f(1;￿) = 0. Second, note that
@f
@p =
(￿ + 1)ln(￿ + 1) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ln(1 + p￿) which is positive at p = 0 (for any ￿ > 0)25. Finally, note that
@2f
@p2 = ￿ ￿2
1+p￿ < 0 so f(p;￿) is concave in p and therefore can cross the horizontal axis only once
more. Thus, since f(p;￿) = 0 for p = 1, it has to be that f(p;￿) lies above the horizontal axis for
all p 2 (0;1).See appendix.
Proposition 2: ￿(pi;mi;ri) ￿ mipi is positive, is increasing in mi and in ri, and is initially
increasing and then decreasing in pi.




ln(1 ￿ pi + pierimi) ￿ pimi
where ri > 0 and pi 2 (0;1). From proposition 1, we know tat it is increasing in ri.
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pi(erimi ￿ 1)(1 ￿ pi)
1 ￿ pi + pierimi > 0 (26)
25To see this, let g(￿) ￿ (￿ + 1)ln(￿ + 1) ￿ ￿. g(0) = 0 and g
0(￿) = 1 + ln(￿ + 1) ￿ 1 = ln(￿ + 1) which is positive
for any ￿ > 0.
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(erimi ￿ 1)(1 ￿ miripi) ￿ rimi
ri (1 ￿ pi + pierimi)
(27)





= sign(g(￿;pi)) where g(￿;p) = (e￿￿1)(1￿￿p)￿￿.
Then note that g(￿;0) = e￿ ￿ 1 ￿ ￿ > 0 for all ￿ > 0 since g(0;0) = 0 and
@g(￿;0)
@￿ = e￿ ￿ 1 > 0, and
that g(￿;1) = (e￿ ￿ 1)(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿ < 0 since g(0;1) = 0 and
@g(￿;1)
@￿ = ￿e￿￿ < 0. Finally, note that
@g
@p = ￿￿(e￿ ￿ 1) is always negative.
Proposition 4 In any pure strategy Nash equilibrium, pro￿ts are zero.
Proof. Let ￿j be the equilibrium price set by ￿rm j. If ￿rm j makes negative pro￿ts, it has
a pro￿table deviation to ￿j > ￿k where it does not sell and makes zero pro￿ts. If ￿rm j makes
positive pro￿ts then it has to be the case that ￿k ￿ ￿j (otherwise ￿rm j￿ s pro￿ts are zero). In such
a case, ￿rm k has a pro￿table deviation to ￿j ￿ ￿ for ￿ > 0 su¢ ciently small. This will make ￿rm
k earn higher pro￿ts.
Proposition 5 If mp￿ + F < min(￿L;￿H) the unique equilibrium is the pooling equilibrium,
￿Pool = mp￿ + F.
Proof. We only need to consider other zero-pro￿t prices. Any such price must sell to either
type L or type H but not to both. However, since ￿Pool < min(￿L;￿H) then setting ￿Pool + ￿ for
￿ > 0 su¢ ciently small will attract all consumers and make positive pro￿ts, which would constitute
a pro￿table deviation.
Proposition 6 If mp￿ + F > min(￿L;￿H) the unique equilibrium with positive demand, if it
exists, is to set ￿ = mp￿ + F and serve only type ￿; where ￿ = H (L) if ￿L < ￿H (￿H < ￿L).
Proof. The pooling price cannot attract both types, and therefore it (generically) cannot make
zero pro￿ts and constitute an equilibrium. without loss of generality, suppose that ￿L < ￿H. In
such a case, any price that attracts type L will also attract type H. Therefore, the only possible
equilibrium is to sell insurance to type H for the zero pro￿ts price, mpH + F. If mpH + F > ￿H
then there is no equilibrium with positive demand.
Proposition For each case described in Table 1, the set of parameters that satisfy the para-
meter restrictions is not empty.
Proof. The proof relies on Table A1, which provides the parameter restrictions for all cases.
Consider case 1. For simplicity, suppose F = 0 and no preference heterogeneity (rH = rL).
Since the risk premium is always positive, all we need is that ￿L < p￿m. Since p￿ is an increasing
function of pH and ￿H but ￿L is not, it is easy to see that with pL su¢ ciently low and pH and ￿H
su¢ ciently high, the inequality will be satis￿ed.
Consider case 2. Suppose that F > 0 is small enough that ￿H ￿ F +pHm is still satis￿ed (e.g.
because rH, and therefore the risk premium for H, is high). It is easy to see that for any F > 0
there exists rL su¢ ciently small below which the risk premium for L is lower than F.
Consider case 3. Suppose rH is small, so the risk premium for H is lower than F, and suppose
that rL is high enough so the risk premium for L is greater than F. It is easy to see that if pH is
su¢ ciently greater than pL (e.g. think of pH close to 1 and of pL close to 0), there is an intermediate
40value for rH that will make H still buy insurance at the pooling price (despite F) and rL su¢ ciently
high that will still make L buy.
Consider case 4. Suppose that rH is su¢ ciently low and F > 0 is high enough, that H will not
buy insurance even for a price of pL.
B Computation details
B.1 Likelihood
This section describes the details of the likelihood calculation. As we describe in more detail in
Section 4, our observation of annuitant mortality is both left-truncated and right censored. The








where S(￿) is the Gompertz survival function, s(￿) is the Gompertz hazard rate, di is an indicator
which is equal to one if individual i died within our sample, ci is individual i￿ s age when they entered
the sample, and ti is the age at which individual i exited the sample, either because of death or
censoring. Our incorporation of ci into the likelihood function accounts for the left truncation in
our data.
The contribution of an individual￿ s guarantee choice to the likelihood is based on the guarantee
choice model above. Recall that the value of a given guarantee depends on preference for wealth
after death, ￿, and annual mortality hazard, which depends on ￿ and ￿. Some additional notation
will be necessary to make this relationship explicit. Let V
A(g)
0 (￿;￿;￿) be the value of an annuity
with guarantee length g to someone with Gompertz parameters ￿ and ￿. Conditional on ￿, the













where 1(￿) is an indicator function. Clearly, if ￿ = 0 no guarantee is chosen. Holding ￿ constant, the
value of a guarantee increases with ￿. Therefore, we know that for each ￿, there is some interval,
[0; ￿ ￿0;5(￿;￿)), such that the zero year guarantee is optimal for all ￿ in that interval. ￿ ￿0;5(￿;￿) is
the value of ￿ that makes someone indi⁄erent between choosing a zero and ￿ve year guarantee.
Similarly there are intervals, (￿ ￿0;5(￿;￿); ￿ ￿5;10(￿;￿)), where the ￿ve year guarantee is optimal, and
(￿ ￿5;10(￿;￿);1), where the ten year guarantee is optimal.26
We can express the likelihood of an individual￿ s guarantee choice in terms of these indi⁄erence
26Note that it is possible that ￿ ￿0;5(￿;￿) > ￿ ￿5;10(￿;￿). In this case there is no interval where the ￿ve year guarantee
is optimal. Instead, there is some ￿ ￿0;10(￿;￿) such that a zero year guarantee is optimal if ￿ < ￿ ￿0;10(￿;￿) and a ten























if g = 10
(30)










where ￿(￿) is the normal cumulative distribution function, ￿￿j￿ = ￿￿ +
￿￿;￿
￿2
￿ (log￿￿￿￿) is the mean







￿ is the standard deviation of ￿ given ￿. The full log
likelihood is obtained by combining l
g
i and lm



















We calculate the integral in equation 32 by quadrature. Let fxjgM
j=1 and fwjgM
j=1 be M quadra-









We maximize the likelihood using a gradient based searched. Although we could simply use
￿nite di⁄erence approximations for the gradient, greater accuracy and e¢ ciency can be obtained
by programming the analytic gradient.
B.2 Guarantee Indi⁄erence Curves
As mentioned in the main text of the paper, the most di¢ cult part of calculating the likelihood is
￿nding the points where people are indi⁄erent between a g and g + 5 year guarantee, ￿ ￿g;g+5(￿;￿).
To ￿nd these points we need to compute the expected utility associated with each guarantee length.















s.t. 0 ￿ wt+1 = (wt + z
g
t ￿ ct)(1 + r) (34)











(1+r)s￿t if t ￿ g
0 if t > g
is the
present discount value of guaranteed future payments at time t. Also, st(￿) is the probability of
being alive at time t and ft(￿) is the probability of dying at time t. Note that a person who
dies at time t, dies before consuming ct or receiving z
g
t . Technically, there are also non-negativity
42constraints on wealth and consumption. However, these constraints will never bind due to the form
of the utility function.
We used the ￿rst order conditions from (34) to collapse the problem to a numerical optimization
over a single variable, consumption at time zero. The ￿rst order conditions for (34) are:
￿tst(￿)c
￿￿
t =￿t 8t 2 f0::Tg (35)
￿tft(￿)￿(wt + G
g
t)￿￿ = ￿ ￿t +
1
1 + r
￿t￿1 8t 2 f1::Tg (36)
(wt + zt ￿ ct)(1 + r) =wt+1 8t 2 f0::T ￿ 1g (37)
where ￿t is the multiplier on the budget constraint at time t. Initial wealth, w0 is taken as given.
It is not possible to completely solve the ￿rst order conditions analytically. However, suppose we
knew c0. Then from the budget constraint (37), we can calculate w1. From the ￿rst order condition




We can use the ￿rst order condition for w1 to solve for ￿1.













Continuing in this way, we can ￿nd the whole path of optimal ct and wt associated with the cho-
sen c0. If this path satis￿es the non-negativity constraints on consumption and wealth, then we have
de￿ned a value function of c0, ~ V (c0;g;￿;￿). Thus, we can reformulate the optimal consumption
problem as an optimization problem over one variable.
max
c0
~ V (c0;g;￿;￿) (41)
Numerically maximizing a function of a single variable is a relatively easy problem and can be done
quickly and robustly. We solve (41) using a simple bracket and bisection method. To check our
program, we compared the value function as computed in this way and by our initial discretization
and backward induction approach. They agreed up to the expected precision.
Computing the Guarantee Indi⁄erence Curves The guarantee indi⁄erence curves, ￿ ￿g;g+5(￿;￿),
are de￿ned as the solution to:
V (g;￿; ￿ ￿g;g+5(￿;￿)) = V (g + 5;￿; ￿ ￿g;g+5(￿;￿)) (42)
For each ￿, we solve for ￿ ￿g;g+5(￿;￿)) using a simple bisective search. Each evaluation of the
likelihood requires ￿ ￿g;g+5(￿(xj);￿)) at each integration point xj. Maximizing the likelihood requires
searching over ￿￿ and ￿￿, which will shift ￿(xj). As mentioned in the main text, rather than
recomputing ￿ ￿g;g+5(￿(xj);￿)) each time ￿(xj) changes, we initially compute ￿ ￿g;g+5(￿;￿)) on a
dense grid of ￿ values and log-linearly interpolate as needed.
43C More Details about the Data
As mentioned in the text, we restrict our sample in several ways:
￿ As is common in the analysis of annuitant choices, we limit the sample to the approximately
sixty percent of annuities that insure a single life. The mortality experience of the single
life annuitant provides a convenient ex-post measure of risk type; measuring the risk type of
a joint life policy which insures multiple lives is less straightforward (Mitchell et al., 1999,
Finkelstein and Poterba 2004, 2006).
￿ We also restrict the sample to the approximately eighty percent of annuitants who hold only
one annuity policy, since characterizing the features of the total annuity stream for individuals
who hold multiple policies is more complicated. Finkelstein and Poterba (2006) make a similar
restriction.
￿ We focus on the choice of guarantee period and abstract from a number of other dimensions
of individuals￿choices.
￿Individuals can choose the timing of their annuitization, although they cannot annuitize
before age 50 (45 for women) or delay annuitizing past age 75 (70 for women). We allow
average mortality and preferences for wealth after death to vary with age at purchase
(as well as gender), but do not explicitly model the timing choice.
￿Annuitants may also take a tax-free lump sum of up to 25 percent of the value of the
accumulated assets. We do not observe this decision ￿ we observe only the amount
annuitized ￿and therefore do not model it. However, because of the tax advantage of
the lump sum ￿income from the annuity is treated as taxable income ￿it is likely that
most individuals fully exercise this option, and ignoring it is therefore unlikely to be a
concern.
￿To simplify the analysis, we analyze policies with the same payment pro￿le, restricting
our attention to the 90 percent of policies that pay a constant nominal payout (rather
than payouts that escalate in nominal terms). As an ancillary bene￿t, this may make
our assumption that individuals all have the same discount rate more realistic.
￿We also drop the less than 1 percent of guaranteed policies which choose a guarantee
length other than 5 or 10 years.
￿ We limit our sample of annuitants to those who purchased a policy between January 1, 1988
and December 31, 1994. Although we also have data on annuitants who purchased a policy
between January 1, 1995 and December 31, 1998, the ￿rm altered its pricing policy in 1995. An
exogenous change in the pricing menu might provide a useful source of variation in estimating
the model. However, if the pricing change arose due to changes in selection of individuals
into the ￿rm ￿or if it a⁄ects subsequent selection into the ￿rm ￿using this variation without
44allowing for changes in the underlying distribution of the annuitant parameters (i.e. in the
joint distribution of ￿ and ￿) could produce misleading estimates. We therefore limit the
sample to the approximately one-half of annuities purchased in the pre-1995 pricing regime.
In principle, we could also separately estimate the model for the annuities purchased in the
post-1995 pricing regime. In practice, the small number of deaths among these more recent
purchasers created problems for estimation in this sample.
￿ Annuitants may choose to purchase their annuity from an insurance company other than the
one in which their fund has been accumulating, and about one-third of annuitants market-
wide choose to do so. As our sample is from a single company, it includes both annuitants
who accumulated their fund with the company and stayed with the company, as well as those
annuitants who brought in external funds. We limit our main analysis to the approximately
two-thirds of individuals in our sample who purchased an annuity with a pension fund that
they had accumulated within our company. In the robustness section, we re-estimate the
model for the one-third of individuals who brought in external funds, and ￿nd similar welfare
estimates.
￿ The pricing of di⁄erent guarantees varies with the annuitant￿ s gender and age at purchase.
We limit our sample of annuitants to those who purchased at the two most common ages of
60 or 65. About three-￿fths of our sample purchased their annuity at 60 or 65. Sample sizes
for other age-gender cells are too small for estimation purposes.
45T a b l e1 :E x a m p l e so ff o u rm a i nc a s e s
Key assumptions Efficient allocation Equilibrium allocation First best? Positive correlation?
1 F=0, r L=r H H and L both insured Only H insured No Yes
2 F>0, r L=r H Only H insured Only H insured Yes Yes
3 F>0, r L>r H Only L insured H and L both insured No No
4 F>0, r L>r H Only L insured Only L insured Yes No
The table provides four cases to illustrate that a positive correlation between coverage and risk occurrence is
neither suﬃcient nor necessary for inference about the eﬃciency of the equilibrium allocation. Section 2 provides a
detailed discussion.
F refers to the ﬁxed load on the insurance policy. H and L refer to risk type (high or low).
rL and rH refer to the risk aversion of the high risk type and low risk type, respectively. Thus, rL >r H
indicates that the low risk type is more risk averse than the high risk type.
“Positive correlation?” refers to whether the reduced form relationship between insurance coverage and risk
occurrence exhibits a positive correlation.
46Table 2: Summary statistics
60 Females 65 Females 60 Males 65 Males All
No. of obs. 1,800 651 1,444 5,469 9,364
Fraction choosing 0 year guarantee 14.0 16.0 15.3 7.0 10.2
Fraction choosing 5 year guarantee 83.9 82.0 78.7 90.0 86.5
Fraction choosing 10 year guarantee 2.1 2.0 6.0 3.0 3.2
Fraction who die within observed mortality period:
   Entire sample 8.4 12.3 17.0 25.6 20.0
   Among those choosing 0 year guarantee 6.7 7.7 17.7 22.8 15.7
   Among those choosing 5 year guarantee 8.7 13.3 17.0 25.9 20.6
   Among those choosing 10 year guarantee 8.1 7.7 16.1 22.9 18.5
Recall that we only observe individuals who are alive as of January 1, 1998, and we observe mortality only for
individuals who die before December 31, 2005.
47Table 3: Annuity payment rates
Guarantee Length 60 Females 65 Females 60 Males 65 Males
0 0.1078 0.1172 0.1201 0.1330
5 0.1070 0.1155 0.1178 0.1287
10 0.1049 0.1115 0.1127 0.1198
These are the rates from January 1992, which we use in our baseline speciﬁcation. A rate is per pound annuitized.
For example, a 60 year old female who annuitized X pounds and chose a 0 year guarantee will receive a nominal
payment of 0.1078X every year until she dies.
48Table 4: Parameter estimates
Estimate Std. Error
μα 60 Females -5.76 (0.165)
65 Females -5.68 (0.264)
60 Males -4.74 (0.223)
65 Males -5.01 (0.189)
σα 0.054 (0.019)
λ 0.110 (0.015)
μβ 60 Females 9.77 (0.221)
65 Females 9.65 (0.269)
60 Males 9.42 (0.300)
65 Males 9.87 (0.304)
σβ 0.099 (0.043)
ρ 0.881 (0.415)
No. of Obs. 9,364
These estimates are for the baseline speciﬁcation. As discussed in the text, the baseline speciﬁcation uses the
following values for other parameters in the model: γ =3 ,r= δ =0 .043,a n dπ =0 .05. Standard errors are in
parentheses; as the value of λ is estimated separately in a ﬁrst stage, we bootstrap the data to compute standard
errors using 100 bootstrap samples.
49Table 5: Within-sample ﬁt
Observed Predicted Observed Predicted Observed Predicted Observed Predicted Observed Predicted
Fraction choosing 0 year guarantee 14.00 14.42 15.98 15.32 15.30 14.49 6.99 7.10 10.24 10.22
Fraction choosing 5 year guarantee 83.94 83.16 82.03 83.21 78.67 80.27 89.98 89.75 86.52 86.57
Fraction choosing 10 year guarantee 2.06 2.42 2.00 1.47 6.03 5.25 3.04 3.15 3.24 3.22
Fraction who die within observed mortality period:
   Entire sample 8.44 7.56 12.29 14.23 17.04 19.73 25.56 25.80 20.03 20.20
   Among those choosing 0 year guarantee 6.75 6.98 7.69 13.21 17.65 18.32 22.77 23.14 15.75 18.60
   Among those choosing 5 year guarantee 8.74 7.63 13.30 14.39 16.99 19.86 25.87 25.31 20.60 20.31
   Among those choosing 10 year guarantee 8.11 8.48 7.69 16.05 16.09 21.67 22.89 27.88 18.48 22.37
Overall 60 Females 65 Females 60 Males 65 Males
This table summarizes the ﬁt of our estimates within sample. For each age-gender cell, we report the observed
quantity (identical to Table 2) and the corresponding quantity predicted by the model. To construct the predicted
death probability, we account for the fact that our mortality data is both censored and truncated, by computing
predicted death probability for each individual in the data conditional on the date of annuity choice, and then
integrating over all individuals.
50Table 6: Out—of-sample ﬁt
60 Females 65 Females 60 Males 65 Males Overall
Life Expectency:
   5th percentile 87.4 86.7 79.4 81.4 79.8
   Median individual 88.1 87.4 80.0 82.1 82.2
   95th percentile 88.8 88.2 80.7 82.8 88.4
   U.K. mortality table 82.5 83.3 78.9 80.0 80.5
Expected value of payments:
   0 year guarantee 19.97 20.34 20.18 21.41 20.63
   5 year guarantee 19.77 20.01 19.72 20.64 20.32
   10 year guarantee 19.44 19.49 19.12 19.61 19.45
   Entire sample 19.79 20.05 19.74 20.66 20.32
   Break-even interest rate 0.0414 0.0430 0.0409 0.0473 0.0448
This table summarizes the ﬁt of our estimates out of sample. The top panel report life expectancies for diﬀerent
percentiles of the mortality distribution, using the parametric distribution on mortality to predict mortality beyond
our mortality observation period. The bottom row of this panel presents the corresponding ﬁgures for the average
pensioner, based on the PFL/PML 1992 period tables for “life oﬃce pensioners” (Institute of Actuaries, 1992).
While the predicted life expectancy is several years greater, this is not a problem of ﬁt; a similar diﬀerence is also
observed for survival probabilities within sample. This simply implies that the average “life oﬃce pensioner” is not
representative of our sample of annuitants. The bottom panel provides the implications of our mortality estimates
for the proﬁtability of the annuity company. These expected payments should be compared with 20, which is the
amount annuitized for each individual in the model. Of course, since the payments are spread over a long horizon
of several decades, the proﬁtability is sensitive to the interest rate we use. The reported results use our baseline
assumption of a real, risk-free interest rate of 0.043. The bottom row provides the interest rate that would make the
annuity company break even (net of various ﬁxed costs).
51Table 7: Welfare estimates
60 Females 65 Females 60 Males 65 Males Average
Observed equilibrium:
   Average wealth-equivalent 100.24 100.40 99.92 100.17 100.16
   Maximum Monet at Stake (MMS) 0.56 1.02 1.32 2.20 1.67
Symmetric information counterfactual:
   Average wealth-equivalent 100.38 100.64 100.19 100.74 100.58
   Absolute welfare difference (M pounds) 43.7 72.0 82.1 169.8 126.5
   Relative welfare difference (as a fraction of MMS) 0.26 0.23 0.21 0.26 0.25
Mandate 0 year guarantee counterfactual:
   Average wealth-equivalent 100.14 100.22 99.67 99.69 99.81
   Absolute welfare difference (M pounds) -30.1 -53.2 -73.7 -146.1 -107.3
   Relative welfare difference (as a fraction of MMS) -0.18 -0.17 -0.19 -0.22 -0.21
Mandate 5 year guarantee counterfactual:
   Average wealth-equivalent 100.25 100.42 99.92 100.18 100.17
   Absolute welfare difference (M pounds) 2.8 6.0 1.7 1.6 2.1
   Relative welfare difference (as a fraction of MMS) 0.02 0.02 0.004 0.002 0.006
Mandate 10 year guarantee counterfactual:
   Average wealth-equivalent 100.38 100.64 100.19 100.74 100.58
   Absolute welfare difference (M pounds) 43.7 72.1 82.3 170.0 126.7
   Relative welfare difference (as a fraction of MMS) 0.26 0.23 0.21 0.26 0.25
The ﬁrst panel presents estimated average wealth equivalents of the annuities under the observed equilibrium,
based on the baseline estimates. The column labeled average is an average weighted by sample size. Wealth equivalents
are the amount of wealth per 100 units of initial wealth that we would have to give a person without an annuity so
he is as well of as with 20 percent of his initial wealth annuitized. The second row presents our measure of MMS as
deﬁn e di ne q u a t i o n( 2 1 ) .
The second panel presents counterfactual wealth equivalents of the annuities under the symmetric information
counterfactual. That is, we assign each individual payments rates such that the expected present value of payments
is equal to the average expected payment per period in the observed equilibrium. This ensures that each person
faces an actuarially fair reductions in payments in exchange for longer guarantees. The absolute diﬀerence row shows
the annual cost of asymmetric information in millions of pounds. This cost is calculated by taking the per pound
annuitized diﬀerence between symmetric and asymmetric information wealth equivalents per dollar annuitized (20,
given the model) and multiplying it by the amount of funds annuitized annually in the U.K., which is six billion
pounds. The relative diﬀerence uses the MMS concept as the normalization factor.
The third panel presents the same quantities for counterfactuals that mandate a single guarantee length for all
individuals, for the actuarially fair pooling price. Each set of results investigates a diﬀerent mandate.
52Table 8: Robustness
Symm. info. Mandate 0 Mandate 5 Mandate 10
1 Baseline specification 100.16 126.5 -107.3 2.1 126.7
Different choices of γ's:
2    Consumption γ=5, Wealth after death γ=5 100.51 111.0 -117.0 0.0 111.0
3    Consumption γ=1.5, Wealth after death γ=1.5 99.92 133.2 -102.0 0.6 133.2
4    Consumption γ=3, Wealth after death γ=5 100.47 120.0 -123.0 3.0 120.0
5    Consumption γ=3, Wealth after death γ=1.5 99.94 135.3 -96.9 2.1 135.3
6    Row 5 + allow heterogeneity in initial wealth
a 101.18 127.4 -148.3 -32.9 128.8
Other parameter choices:
7    r=0.05 and δ=0.05 99.29 119.4 -97.5 5.7 119.4
8    Fraction annuitized (η) = 0.3 100.65 114.0 -118.0 0.0 114.0
9    Fraction annuitized (η) = 0.1 99.93 135.0 -108.0 -4.2 135.0
10    January 1990 annuity rates 100.16 123.0 -112.5 0.0 123.0
Parametereization of heterogeneity:
11    Non-Gompertz mortality distribution
b 100.06 144.0 -100.8 6.0 144.0
12    α dist. Gamma, β dist. Lognormal 100.20 132.0 -111.6 3.0 132.0
13    α dist. Gamma, β dist. Gamma 100.14 123.0 -105.6 3.0 123.0
14    Allow covariates
c 100.17 132.0 -110.1 3.0 132.0
15    β fixed, Consumption γ heterogeneous
d 100.55 129.3 -110.0 2.1 129.4
Wealth portfolio outside of compulsory annuity:
16    Half of initial wealth in public annuity
e 99.95 255.6 -426.3 -34.2 243.6
Departure from neo-classical model:
17    Some individuals always "pick the middle"
f 100.22 132.0 -99.9 9.0 132.0
Different sample:
18    "External" individuals
g 95.40 137.4 -134.4 -16.8 137.7
Average wealth 
equivalent
Average absolute welfare difference Specification
T h et a b l er e p o r t ss u m m a r yr e s u l t s—a v e r a g ewealth equivalent and average welfare eﬀects — from a variety of
speciﬁcations of the model. Each speciﬁcation is discussed in the text in more detail. Each speciﬁcation is shown on
a separate row of Table 8 and diﬀers from the baseline speciﬁcation from Table 7 (and reproduced in the ﬁrst row of
Table 8) in only one dimension, keeping all other assumptions as in the baseline case.
a See text for the parameterization of the unobserved wealth distribution. For comparability, the average wealth-
equivalent is normalized to be out of 100 so that it is on the same scale as in the other speciﬁcations.





with h =1 .5 (Gompertz, as in the baseline, has
h =1 ).
c Covariates (for the mean of both α and β) consist of the annuity premium and the education level at the
individual’s ward.
d β is ﬁxed at the estimated μβ (see Table 4). Since the resulting utility function is non-homothetic, we use the
average wealth in the population and renormalize, as in row 6. See text for more details.
e We assume the public annuity is constant, nominal, and actuarially fair for each person.
f The welfare estimates from this speciﬁcation only compute welfare for the “rational” individuals, ignoring the
individuals who are assumed to always pick the middle.
g “External” individuals are individuals who did not accumulated their annuitized funds with the company whose
data we analyze. These individuals are not used in the baseline analysis (see Appendix C).
53Table A1: Parameter restrictions for each case
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πL ≥ F + pLm
πH <F+ pHm
(
πL ≥ F + p∗m
πH ≥ F + p∗m
πL − pLm ≥ F + λH(pH − pL)m




πL ≥ F + pLm
πH <F+ pHm
(
πL ≥ F + pLm
πH <F+ pLm
πL − pLm ≥ F
πH − pHm<F− (pH − pL)m
F>0
rL >r H
The table provides precise parameter restrictions for each of the cases presented in Table 1. The table is used in
the proof of Proposition A.
54Figure 1: Schematic indiﬀerence sets
The ﬁgure provides a stylized illustration of the pairs of points (α,β) which would make individuals indiﬀerent
between choosing 0 year guarantee and 5 year guarantee (lower left curve) and between 5 year guarantee and 10 year
guarantee (upper right curve). We later compute these sets using the baseline guarantee choice model, the calibrated
values of the parameters that we do not estimate (see Section 3), and the observed annuity rates (Table 3); the sets
are not a function of the estimated parameters (except that in practice we ﬁrst estimate λ, the shape parameter of
the Gompertz hazard, and present the indiﬀerence sets for our estimated λ; see text for more details). Individuals
are represented as points in this space, with individuals between the curves predicted to choose 5 year guarantee, and
individuals below (above) the lower (upper) curve predicted to choose 0 (10) year guarantee. In Figure 2 we present
the empirical counterpart of this stylized ﬁgure.





The ﬁgure presents the estimated indiﬀerence sets, providing an empirical analog to Figure 1. It also presents
scatter plots from the estimated joint distribution of (logα,logβ); each point is a random draw from the estimated
distribution in the baseline speciﬁcation. The estimated indiﬀerence sets for the 65 year old males are given by the
pair of dark dashed lines, for the 60 year old males by the pair of lighter dashed lines, for the 65 year old females by
the pair of dotted lines, and for the 60 year old females by the pair of solid lines.
56Figure 3: Welfare contours
The ﬁgure super-imposes iso-welfare (wealth equivalent) contour lines on the previous Figure 2. Individuals with
wealth equivalent greater than 100 would voluntarily annuitize, while individuals with wealth equivalent less than
100 would not. Each panel represents a diﬀerent age-gender cell: 60 year old females (upper left), 65 year old females
(upper right), 60 year old males (lower left), and 65 year old males (lower right).
57Figure 4: Welfare change contours (symmetric information)
The ﬁgure presents Figure 2, with contour lines that present the change in welfare (wealth equivalent) from the
counterfactual exercise of symmetric information. Individuals with positive (negative) welfare change are estimated
to gain (lose) from symmetric information, compared to their welfare in the observed asymmetric information equi-
librium. Each panel represents a diﬀerent age-gender cell: 60 year old females (upper left), 65 year old females (upper
right), 60 year old males (lower left), and 65 year old males (lower right).
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